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Keynote speeCh
harvey rishiKof: Thank you very, very much. First of  all I would like to say what a great 
pleasure it is to be here. I have a lot of  fondness for American University. Dean Grossman and I 
started as deans together, and he stayed a little bit longer in one institution than I have. But the other 
reason I am particularly pleased to be here is because of  the panel that you have assembled.
I think I know all of  the panelists, and it is hard to imagine a greater collection of  grey matter on 
these issues than you have with Laura, and Louis, and Sandra, and Shoon, and with Dan who is 
going to be moderating it, and then with Stephen if  he’s here, who is going to moderate, and then 
Andrew, then two Andrews, and Karen, Daphne, and Cully—it’s really an amazing group. And 
usually in the keynote, they’ve only given me about fifteen or twenty minutes, so it’s much more like 
being a groom at a wedding. Which is, you’re supposed to show up, say “I do,” and remain quiet for 
the rest of  the day.
But I am going to just frame it a little bit more seriously, that we’ve been living with the AUMF now 
for almost twelve or thirteen years but, and it’s dealing with a complex issue. And one of  my first 
jobs when I was at the Bureau, when I came on board, there was a number of  domestic terrorism 
issues. And the domestic terrorism issue that we first, sort of—you’re not old enough, I think all, to 
remember—was Ruby Ridge. And that created a real problem for the legal community as we tried to 
figure out what to do. And then we had another set—that was like in the early 90s—and around ‘92, 
we then had the problem of  Koresh and the Waco incident. And that created another level of  issues 
for us to think through how to deal with domestic terrorism.
And then oddly enough, on my watch, the other issue that sort of  broke when I was at the federal 
government was the O.K. bomb in Oklahoma. And it’s hard to imagine, but the anniversary of  the 
OK bomb is 2015, April 19th. When I was in Oklahoma, actually, in the beginning of  the week, 
because the law school there is going to launch its first homeland institute, out of  a law school, to 
focus on the issue of  domestic terrorism and domestic radicalization. And I am saying this because, 
when we began to see, when I was at the Bureau, the relationship of  domestic terrorism with 
international terrorism, was when we had, there was the first attempt to take down the World Trade 
towers, with the Blind Sheikh. And then on my watch when I was at the Bureau, we had something 
that was extraordinary, which was the attack on the two embassies in Africa.
And I—a small group of  us began to realize—that the world was changing; that we had a 
relationship of  domestic and international terrorism that we had not really seen before. And also 
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that these non-government entities could be quite lethal, and that they were attacking the United 
States. So one of  the seminal documents was—how many of  you have read Osama Bin Laden’s 
1996 fatwa? Other than—oh, see, the geniuses have all read it, of  course—but I encourage you to 
look at it, because you really see it is a blueprint for the notion of  attack.
So with that, the AUMF debate, I see much more as part of  a much larger debate. And the first 
part of  the debate is, which many of  the panelists are familiar with, is first the issue of, how 
we understand surveillance? And that’s, as you know, the [PATRIOT Act section] 215, [Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act section] 702 issue. And that’s generated its own—and many of  the 
people on the panel have also written in that area. And it’s sort of  the issue of, the notion of  how 
you understand intelligence, data, and communications in the 21st Century. And that’s at the “fore 
eyes,” I like to think of  this analogy as much more of  a snake, that the USG, when it acts in a lethal 
way, is like a snake. And when a snake slithers into an AOR, it wants the surveil it, the surveillance 
is our entire apparatus that we use for surveillance. And that increasingly is becoming a major issue 
about how we understand the role of  government, how we understand privacy, and how the world 
has changed because of  big data. And you’ve had conferences on that, but that is at the front end 
of  this big issue. And the second issue is, this is all leaning forward to take care of  the threat of  
terrorism. And terrorism we know is a tactic, and as a tactic, it is associated with certain groups. But 
we are trying to deal with a tactical problem.
When you move forward to the AUMF, as you all know, what is unprecedented about the AUMF 
for people of  my age, is we declared war not only on states, but we declared war on organizations—
which is unprecedented. And we actually declared war on persons—which is unprecedented. And it 
was unprecedented because we are trying to deal with this new phenomena, an NGO that was lethal. 
And we also did something which was controversy at that point, was that we decided to use military, 
and not law enforcement. And that was a major threshold change—that we were going to treat 
terrorists as a military threat, an NGO, and not a criminal threat. And that has then led to the next 
level of  issues, which was the interrogation debates. And how much when you fight terrorism, it 
turns on information. That’s the coin of  the realm, and it was the coin of  the realm because we were 
moving in the Bureau from what we used to call a prosecutorial paradigm to a prevention paradigm. 
That was totally new for the Bureau; we used to wait for something to happen before we actually 
unleashed our resources and capacities and capabilities. But the President started leaning on us to 
become much more preventive. Which then led to a much more, leaning forward issue, in a whole 
range of  areas.
And then we got the AUMF, which when you look at it, has a very preventive capability—or 
capacity, depending on how broadly you interpret it. And that’s what you guys are all going to talk 
about over the next couple of  hours: is the different categories, as you are going to parse what the 
2001 and 2002 AUMFs mean. And as you know there have been lots of  reports—I am sure there 
are going to be categories that you guys are going to look at—which is: sort of  the scope of  how 
you authorize force; how you understand international conditions for the use of  force; the types of  
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military authorization that you are going to be using; how much do you get involved; the targets of  
the use of  military force; what you see as the purpose; whether or not you should have geographical 
limitations; whether there are military unit limitations; whether or not the targeting, as associated 
with forces, is going to be limited; whether or not, how you understand, specific provisions for a 
Syria limitation; whether or not there should be a repeal aspect; whether or not there should be a 
sunset aspect; how much reporting there should be; this is all the detailed aspects, I’m sure, that you 
are going to be discussing over the next couple of  hours.
And for me, that’s interesting, but the large question is—which you will discuss—is: what is the 
appropriate relationship of  the Congress to the Executive, when the Executive projects force. And 
Lou has written a lot about this, and Lou comes out with a particular perspective, so you will have 
very strong executive voices, which I don’t know how strong they will be on the panels—Dan will 
be with the executive voice—and a very congressional event. But the bottom line that it comes to, 
to me, is what we’re really considering when you think of  the whole gamut of  this—starting with 
the surveillance, to the notion of  projecting force, to detention, to interrogation issues, is that we 
have not solved the problems. We’re thirteen years into this, and we do not have clear public policy 
positions, there is still a great deal of  legal debate, as to what is the appropriate way to go, and I 
think we need to have some resolution, and clarity: a) for the American public, b) for the military, 
and c) for law enforcement, and d) for the ultimate legitimacy of  what we’ve been doing for the last 
thirteen years. I just came from a meeting that we’re doing, a project at the National War College 
at NDU, with a range of  experts, and I’m co-writing something on the legal issue, and I had to 
say to them: there’s still unsettlement, if  we take someone, and capture them, do we bring them to 
Guantanamo? Do we bring them to Article III courts? We still have military commissions that are 
not totally resolved. So your AUMF raises all of  these issues in different aspects of  how an executive 
should be interpreting it. There are some who believe we should not go forward with the AUMF, 
not only for political reasons, but because that’s just not, at this point in time, something we need the 
Executive to be involved in with Congress.
People are upset about sunset; [Former] Judge [Michael] Mukasey testified that he believes in a 
sunset clause that would be 10 years. Every aspect is something that I think you can write about and 
think about. And I think it is great that AU has decided to do this, and do this debate, it’s wonderful; 
it’s a reflection of  the grey matter that exists—and I mean that in the most positive way—not the 
grey matter on your head, but the grey matter in your head. And that Laura has very well-known 
positions, and is extremely articulate, as is Lou—you’ve got the people—and I’m really curious, and 
hope to read the final law review journal on this, as to where you break, as to what is the appropriate 
way to approach, but the AUMF—all I am saying—is large, and part of  a much broader national 
security set of  problems and discussions, that it’s nestled into and that it is worthy of  having this 
type of  focus. And I want you in the end to think through particularly the law student in the next 
generation, how you really want Congress to be engaged, when we are using lethality, and we are 
fighting something that we still have not been able to well-characterize. And should this ultimately be 
a criminal approach, versus a military approach? We’ve gone military, but it’s unclear to me whether 
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or not, we should not, for legitimacy purposes, not do this as a criminal matter.
And then I’ll end with: this debate spun so many elements, our old, part of  the posse, with my 
committee, is our friend Amos [Guiora] has just penned a law review article on the drone court. 
That drones, because they are so different as a platform, and because we are not following the 
Geneva Convention because people actually have uniforms, that we need a special due process 
requirement process before we use our lethality. Now as you know, Israel has gone down a different 
route, when it comes to the use of  drones and the role of  the courts. So I will end with the final 
point; that you are looking a lot at the role of  Congress, but what has been unprecedented, I think, 
in the last twelve or thirteen years, has been the role of  the federal courts intervening in what has 
traditionally been an executive process. As we sit here, we have the DC courts are dealing with 
material witness issues, they are adjudicating what makes someone guilty enough to be able to be 
held. The court is involved in—as people think—if  you are guilty enough to be held, are you guilty 
enough to be a target? So I sort of  challenge you to think about, what you think the appropriate 
role also is of  the federal courts down the road, that you think should be playing in this arena, for 
interpreting what should take place. It’s a very large table that you all can I hope write about, and 
we’ll be having a national security writing competition for the American Bar Association, on national 
security law topics; it’s going to be an open topic, and for law students, there will be a five-hundred 
dollar award if  you’re selected, so I encourage you to write your second and third year papers on any 
aspect of  this issue, and then submit it to the ABA for the competition, because we want to engage 
you as the next generation.
I am exactly at 2:30; I’ll sum up on that if  that’s appropriate, so that you stay on time. I would love 
to stay for the whole day, but unfortunately I have to fly to Seattle, that’s why we started at 2:00, I 
have another lawyer-like commitment. And, I want to thank, though, two people in particular: Jesse, 
who did an amazing job, he wrote me a set of  remarks to do this. And the other individual that is 
sitting there, as part of  the law firm that we’ve put together is, Renalba. And these two have been 
really behind a great deal of  the work that’s done and I want to thank them and recognize them.
So with that, I will give up the podium to the next panel, and I look forward to reading what your 
thoughts and insights are in this particular area. Thanks so much. 
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FALL AUMF SYMPOSIUM PANEL 1: A HISTORY OF 
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND CREATION 
OF AUMF
DAN MARCUS: Okay, right on time, I’m Dan Marcus I teach National Security Law and 
Constitutional Law here at the law school in my old age.  This panel is going to set the table for 
Panel 2.  Panel 2 is going to deal with sort of  the current, burning issues of  the existing AUMF 
to support the war against ISIS or ISIL or the Islamic State and if  not, what should we do about 
it.  We’re going to provide what we hope will be a broad and interesting background to the current 
issues by talking about the relationships between the President and Congress under the Constitution 
with respect to waging war, the War Powers Resolution, which Congress passed in 1974 to try to 
reset the balance between Congress and the President after the Vietnam War, and the history of  the 
use of  AUMFs instead of  declarations of  war as a vehicle for Congress to authorize the President to 
go to war.  
In a sense, although we did not call it an AUMF at the time, the War Powers Resolution was the 
product of  Congress being dissatisfied with its experience under, what you could say, was the first 
AUMF, the Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution in 1964, which was, maybe a few people in this room besides 
me will remember personally.  I was at law school at the time and this was in the middle of  the 
Vietnam War and it was Lyndon Johnson’s effort on the eve of  the escalation of  the Vietnam War 
to get congressional buy-in to what he and his predecessors had been doing and what he believed 
he would be doing in the future.  And Congress, after the Vietnam War went south and after the 
Vietnam War was expanded significantly beyond what many members of  Congress thought they 
were authorizing, although they should have read the language of  their authorization and they would 
have realized they had given Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon a blank check, but that was what 
led, after the Vietnam War had been winding down, to Congress asserting themselves by enacting 
the War Powers Resolution, which was passed over President Nixon’s veto and which was still the 
law of  the land.  
With that intro, let me introduce our distinguished panelists.  I think you have a handout with their 
bios so I won’t say much about them.  Going left to right, from my right, Laura Donahue is sort of  
the Steve Vladeck, Jennifer Daskel and Dan Marcus combined at Georgetown Law School.  She is 
a Professor of  Law and runs the Center for National Security Law at Georgetown and she also has 
a PhD. Next to her is Lou Fisher, who I told him I would introduce as Mr. War Powers Resolution.  
Lou is now a scholar-in-residence at the Constitution Project, which has done a lot of  very good 
work on national security issues. Before that, for forty years or so, Lou worked for the Library of  
Congress, for most of  that time at the Congressional Research Service and later at the law library.  
Lou has written more than any other human being about war powers, the War Powers Resolution, 
and separation of  powers between the President and Congress.  
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Next to him is Sandra Hodgkinson.  Sandra is now in the private sector where she is Vice President 
and Chief  of  Staff  at DRS Technologies, which is a major defense company and defense contractor.  
She has a long career in government, before that starting off  in the JAG Corps, occupying several 
senior positions at the Department of  Defense including being Deputy Assistant of  Defense for 
Detainee Affairs.  
Next to Sandra is Shoon Murray who is our guest from the main campus.  June is at the AU School 
for International Service and has a PhD in Political Science. If  Mr. Fisher is Mr. War Powers 
Resolution, June is Ms. AUMF because she has just completed a book, which we all should read on 
the AUMF of  2001, probably the most important most controversial AUMF in history, although the 
Gulf  of  Tonkin resolution if  we call it a AUMF we might give it a run for its money. 
Ok, with that intro, I’m going to moderate a discussion, we are not going to have opening 
statements, there is so much to talk about here that I think we ought to get right into it. Let me start 
by just reminding the law students here, some of  whom if  we have 1Ls here haven’t even taken 
constitutional law yet. I’m just going to take 30 seconds on the division of  war powers between the 
President and Congress and the constitution, I think a lot of  us grew up thinking the President as 
sort of  the king of  war, well it’s not really that way in the constitution as most of  the war powers in 
the constitution are located in Article I of  the Constitution they’re Congress’ powers, including the 
power to declare war, the power to raise support army, and the navy and the power to legislate rules 
and regulations for the armed forces. 
The President is the Commander-in-Chief  of  the armed forces and what’s happened over the years, 
so everyone, pretty much everyone, except John Hu, agrees that Congress is the entity that starts 
wars and the President is the guy who runs the wars, but over time as the world became more and 
more complex, the President started feeling they had to do a lot of  things without authorization 
from Congress, like defend the united states from attacks so the doctrine of  the defense of  war 
power that the President has to repel, to take action to repel attacks against the united states grew 
up and was sort of  blessed by the supreme court, ok, so with that introduction, let me start off  
with a simple question for the panel and that is the constitution talks about Congress declaring war, 
why don’t we do that anymore? The last declaration of  war by the united states was in world war 
ii and now we use, when we do anything, we do authorizations to use military force, I always tell 
my students in Common Law that from a constitutional standpoint the AUMF are the functional 
equivalent of  a declaration of  war, but is that really true, do you think and what’s the historical 
reason for the switch, do you think? Who wants to go first on that? Laura. 
LAURA DONAHUE: Great, thank you very much. So what I’d like to do for the students who 
haven’t taken con law before is just quickly say a word about the actual language in the constitution 
because this matters for how we think about the AUMF. The constitutional convention actually 
initially considered using the phrase “to make war” and on August 17, 1777 in Madison’s notes 
of  the convention we read the colloquy that actually changed the wording to “to declare war” 
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for Congress to actually declare war. In this instance Mr. Pickney suggested that the authority to 
make war should rest with the senate with the idea that the senate is more acquainted with foreign 
affairs than the President or the executive branch would be. And it was actually James Madison 
who proposed, with Mr. Jerry seconding this, that the words be changed to “declare war” on the 
grounds that the executive could repel attack, but it’s only Congress that could move us affirmatively 
to a state of  war. So Charmin agreed with this, Mr. Charmin agreed with this, the executive should 
be able to repel, not to commence wars, but only to repel attacks on the homeland and in fact Mr. 
Jerry then weighed in and said he would never expect to hear in a republic the suggestion that the 
executive alone should be able to declare war. So Ellsworth then put forth the suggestion that it 
should be hard to go to war, that should require Congress to act and we should place this power 
with one of  our most bureaucratic entities, to make it difficult to move the country to this particular 
state of  war, that that was very important. It should be easier to make peace than to go to war. 
Mason was against giving it to the Executive, because the Executive could not be trusted with this 
decision on where and when the United States was to be taken to war. So he also wanted to clog the 
pipeline. And on these grounds, it was then agreed that we would insert ‘declare’ instead of  ‘make’ 
into the Constitution. 
So the choice of  wording that we have, was actually fought over, discussed and argued at the 
Constitutional Convention very carefully to ensure that the United States does not go to war unless 
Congress has weighed in. And we do have very clear instances—World War II for instance, after 
the bombing of  Pearl Harbor, we have very clear declarations of  war. But then in Korea, we have 
nothing other than what Simon had pointed to: appropriations, for instance, as being sufficient. 
This was also the heart of  Vinson’s dissent in Youngstown- that appropriations could be taken 
as a blessing from Congress on this. This is partly why the War Powers Resolution subsequently 
addressed the question of  appropriations. Then we have the 1964 Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution, which 
again is not a declaration of  war. 
So with regard to Vietnam you have Congress coming forward and stopping short of  declaring 
war, instead giving authorization to the President to actually take- here’s the language- “all necessary 
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of  the United States,” and then “to take all 
necessary steps including armed force to assist any member or protocol state of  the South East Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance.” 
And pretty much since the Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution, what we’ve seen is a steady shift in terms of  
the verbiage employed, and we’ve moved away from a declaration of  war to the authorization for the 
use of  military force. 
DAN MARCUS: Let me just follow up, and maybe Lou, or Shoon, or Sandy would like to talk about 
this. But why is the . . . your remarks, Laura, seem to suggest that an AUMF is something less than a 
declaration of  war. And maybe it is for purposes of  International Law, but domestically, if  anything, 
it has more standing because it’s signed by the President. 
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A declaration of  war, the President has nothing to do with. He usually asks for it, but it’s an action . . 
. Congress has the power to declare war without the President. I guess it’s never done that, although 
the Congress has pushed presidents into wars occasionally. But Lou, do you want to comment on 
that?
LOU FISHER: Yeah, what Laura brought up, that debate on August 17 was my birthday; that’s 
why I can always remember it. But also, at that time, the Federalists papers, one that’s overlooked 
a lot is John Jay’s No. 4. John Jay was the specialist in foreign affairs. You might think he is more 
sympathetic to executive power, but he was not. 
He explained that he and other framers looked out over the centuries as to how nations had gone 
to war, and what they found were that single executives- princes, kings, everyone else, they would go 
to war not for the national interests, they would go for personal interests, for family interests, for all 
kind of  interests. And one after another, calamities for the country, in terms of  deaths and fortunes 
squandered. So the framers, from their study of  history, understood that you never let a single 
executive go to war. 
And also, on this question of  authorization versus declaration, the first war we got involved in—
1798- was not declared. That was a quasi-war against France. So from the start . . . and that got to 
the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said Congress can do either one- it can either authorize 
or declare, they’re equivalent. One’s not lesser than the other.
As we march on, I think the Constitution was pretty well protected up until what we’ve 
already mentioned- Harry Truman going to war on his own in June 1950. To me, it was flatly 
unconstitutional. He himself, when the Senate was debating the U.N. Charter, said, “I would 
never use U.S. troops in a U.N. action without getting approval from Congress first.” So that’s a 
presidential pledge.
But the U.N. Charter states that all the member states will give forces to the U.N. in accordance with 
their “constitutional processes,” and each nation therefore had to decide, “What’s our constitutional 
process? How do we go to war?” Congress debated that in December 1945, after the Senate 
approved the U.N. Charter, Congress passed the U.N. Participation Act. Section Six says anytime the 
President wants to U.S. forces in a U.N. action, you come to Congress first and get approval. And 
Truman signed it without any objections. 
So to me, that was a huge step forward on unconstitutional wars and became a precedent. Clinton 
often went to the U.N. or to NATO to circumvent Congress. He never came to Congress once. 
Of  course Obama, 2011, going to the Security Council for Libya. So I think in terms of  stepping 
away from the Constitution, violating the basic principles, Korea was a huge step, and we’ve never 
recovered from it. 
DAN MARCUS: Yes. Sandy.
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SANDRA HODGKINSON: I have a little more of  an executive branch perspective in a lot of  the 
experiences that I’ve had. But I think you do need to take a distinction between the self-defense of  
the nation and this notion of  just going off  to war for private gain. So we have developed into an 
era where the Commander-in-Chief  is viewed and considered to have, in these Article II powers, the 
ability to defend the nation, and to defend the nation from a repel or a foreign attack. And he needs 
to be able to do that. 
I mean, I recognize that one of  the constraints people view is it should be hard to make war. 
It shouldn’t be hard to defend the nation. And Congress has flatly shown that it’s incapable of  
responding in (a) a real-world timeframe, to actually declare war. It hasn’t used that power to do so. 
It is frankly unable, generally, to even come up with a . . . whether you call it lesser included AUMF, 
they are not responsive. And as a third matter, the question is do you really want them to be, because 
throughout history, one of  the great advantages of  militaries is the ability to have some notion of  a 
surprise attack. 
It isn’t always great to have every one of  your tactics played out in the media, played out in debates, 
dragged on for months, brought from state to state to state to state, debated, put on YouTube, put 
on CNN, and then, “Look! Hey! Guess what? We’re about to start an air attack.” So there’re some 
practicalities that develop from it. But I think you need to take a look at both the AUMF in its 
historical context from the Constitution, and what it’s evolved in today. 
And in today, in a post U.N. developed world, we look at legitimate bases for the use of  armed force, 
and these legitimate bases include self-defense, and they include whether it’s a U.N. Security Council 
Resolution that is agreed to by nation states to protect breaches to peace and security. So there is a 
method out there that looks at legitimate bases for going to war. A legitimate basis for going to war 
is not to go try to gain more territory or get rich or plunder, as it was in the old days. That’s not even 
a lawful basis anymore.
So arguably, some of  the very rights that were trying to be protected at the time the Constitution 
was there are no longer really existing in the modern world as legitimate bases for going to war. And 
so maybe the protection and the debate over AUMFs, and how much Congress should be involved, 
and how much the President should be involved, have evolved into a different environment. 
I know we’re going to move on to other questions where we can talk about whether there is now 
a healthy tension there. I think an argument may be, to me, made there. I’m not arguing there isn’t 
a rule from Congress, but I’m simply arguing that the times are different, and so that very debate, 
while enshrined importantly in history, may be slightly different in a post-UN world. 
SHOON MURRAY: I just want to go back to the original question of  why you no longer declare 
war, and is an authorization for the use of  force the functional equivalent of  a declaration of  war? I 
don’t think it always is. There have been authorizations for the use of  force from the very beginning, 
as Lou suggested, with the quasi-war with France, and it was not to have a full-out war. It was to 
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limit war to the sea, and not to land. It was to engage with ships, and not to take on France, because 
the United States couldn’t at the time, [laughs] not to take on a full-fledged war. 
And there have been something short of  three dozen authorizations over time, and they vary in 
scope. Some of  them are quite minor. And some of  them, like the authorization- the 2001- are quite 
broad. And if  you have a declaration of  war, doesn’t that then trigger other powers that even bring 
the presidential authority domestically, where an authorization for the use of  military force is short 
of  that?
DAN MARCUS: That’s a good point. Of  course we did use AUMFs for what you might consider 
traditional wars, both in the Gulf  War in 1991 and in the Iraq War in 2003, where we were sending 
hundreds of  thousands of  troops to invade a country, or to defend a country in the first instance. 
But it is an interesting point. But nobody talks and now maybe no one talks about declarations of  
war anymore, and I don’t think other countries use them either very much since World War II. 
And I wonder if  the declaration of  war is sort of  a- although it’s enshrined in our Constitution, and 
we’ve always taken it very seriously, whether it’s kind of  a- not a relic, but of  an earlier time when 
nation states regarded war, as Sandy indicated, as a choice and as a part of  a formal established 
process. The AUMF, arguably, can be lesser, but it arguably provides some more flexibility, yeah. 
LAURA DONAHUE: So, a few points. Your premise suggests that in a post-AUMF world, but 
it’s actually historically back to the Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution. So it’s in a world of  nation states 
in which we saw the demise from declare war, actually being perpetrated. And that’s why the War 
Powers Resolution was introduced. So to your question as to why we now see this kind of  action, 
the War Powers Resolution was introduced because of  the Vietnam War and because of  the extent 
of  that conflict, and the blood and the treasure, and the risk that was posed to the United States in 
the course of  that conflict. 
So Congress introduced the War Powers Resolution to try to reign in the Executive Branch. Now, 
the War Powers Resolution is full of  constitutional problems, if  you read it. In fact, it’s one of  the 
most revisionist resolutions I think Congress has ever passed. It begins by saying that the President 
will apply armed forces into hostility. So it says that is the intent of  the framers, is to prevent the 
President from introducing troops into hostilities. Nowhere in the notes of  the Convention or in the 
Federalist papers, and John Jay’s writings is it just about hostilities. 
It is about warfare, as Shoon mentions, right? It is about moving the country to a state of  war. So 
I’m somewhat perplexed at this concept that it’s, “We don’t want to reveal our battle plans,” certainly 
not. But if  we are going to attack another country, the idea that we want to vest in the executive the 
authority to surprise attack and to choose an enemy, and to go after anybody or any person or any 
group, any organization in the world, and to leave that decision to the Executive Branch, for the 
founding generation, that would have been the very definition of  tyranny.
DAN MARCUS: Lou?
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LOU FISHER: This funny issue, why we don’t declare war any more. Actually, Alexander Hamilton, 
in one of  the federalist papers, said that even declarations in Europe were going out of  style. So he 
saw it early. The only explanation I’ve ever heard, which doesn’t make any sense to me, was that the 
UN Charter was against aggressive war. That’s why you don’t want to declare war. But authorization 
is the same militarily as a declaration. 
And the other thing on surprise attacks—yes, presidents are supposed to have authority to repel 
sudden attacks without getting initial authority from Congress. And yet, interestingly, World War II 
began with a surprise attack, and Roosevelt never said, “Therefore, I can go to war on my own.” He 
came to Congress, got a declaration. And 9/11 was another surprise attack, but Bush never claimed 
he could go to war on his own. He came and got- so I think there is, in addition to all the legalities . 
. .
DAN MARCUS: He never said he couldn’t [chuckles]. 
LOU FISHER: Wait, let me finish my point. In addition to all the legalities, there’s a practical 
example of  when you go to war, that both branches have to be on board. 
SANDRA HODGKINSON: But I would caveat by saying that no President in the history of  the 
United States has actually said that it was lawful to require Congress, under the War Powers Act, that 
they would have to come to Congress in every case. They have consistently said that the Article II 
powers allow them, as the Commander-in-Chief, to make, on behalf  of  the country, the decisions to 
call into action the military to repel a sudden attack. So 9/11, while it had the support of  Congress, 
did not at any time, did President Bush say that he required their Act in order for him to go to war. 
What’s important about the debate- and you can argue back and forth on both sides as you see 
happening- the truth is that what I believe the War Powers Resolution does is it still instills a healthy 
dialogue between Congress and the Executive Branch, which is the most important part of  it. Is it 
true to the original reading of  the Constitution? No. In fact, I would say that history has moved us 
beyond where there aren’t actually declarations of  war anymore for practical purposes. 
But what the AUMF does is it allows for there to continue to be a debate and a dialogue, and a role 
for Congress in letting the President know just how far the President should be looking as far as 
military action goes. Certainly the President will respond immediately and do what the President can. 
And they always argue that it’s consistent with the War Powers Resolution. But they never say that 
they are acting and seeking Congress’s support in accordance with, or in order to comply with. 
Because neither Republican nor Democratic presidents have said that they need to comply with 
the War Powers Resolution. So again, I think there is a very healthy role for Congress here. But you 
have to be careful between what you think is actually legally required, and whether or not Democrat 
or Republican presidents have complied with it, because in fact both Democratic and Republican 
presidents have not. 
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DAN MARCUS: Of  course the War Powers Resolution doesn’t and can’t, as a constitutional matter, 
enlarge or restrict Congress’s powers or the President’s powers beyond what the Constitution does. 
And the War Powers Resolutions has all these savings clauses reciting constitutional principles. 
But the great genius, if  you will, of  the War Powers Resolution- I’m going to use this to set up 
a discussion on the War Powers Resolution- what a lot of  people think is that it’s a de facto 
authorization by Congress for the President to commit U.S. troops, whether it’s offensive, defensive, 
rescuing people, whatever, for up to 60 days, without Congress’s approval, subject to consultation 
requirements including pre-consultation wherever possible, and reporting every ten minutes or so by 
the President, as to what he’s doing. 
And then of  course the arguably unconstitutional provision that says he’s got to stop after 60 days if  
Congress doesn’t say it’s okay. So let’s start a discussion of  how does the War Powers Resolution do 
it? Is it working pretty well in resetting the balance between Congress and the President as a practical 
matter? Is it a terrible thing one-way or the other? So go ahead, Laura.
LAURA DONAHUE: So I just want to bring out this idea that this is a brilliant solution. Successive 
administrations considered it unconstitutional. Nixon at the time vetoed it on those grounds. The 
Obama Administration, although it now accepts the constitutionality generally of  the War Powers 
Resolution, it still objects, for instance, to 2C, one of  the clauses in the War Powers Resolution, 
which states that, “The Constitutional powers of  the President as Commander-in-Chief  to introduce 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement of  hostilities 
is clearly indicated may only be exercised pursuant to three conditions.” 
“First, a declaration of  war; second, specific statutory authorization; or third, a national emergency 
created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions or its armed forces.” 
The Obama Administration, as other administrations, objects to this, which is basically a policy 
statement. It’s that congressional sense of  what the Constitution requires, disagrees with this as a 
constitutional reading. The Nixon Administration also objected to another clause, and here’s Section 
5C, which requires the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from a region. 
They shall be removed if  in fact all of  the requirements have not been met in the War Powers 
Resolution. And you could argue that this interferes with the President’s Commander-in-Chief ’s 
authorities, and that’s why, for successive administrations, there were constitutional objections. 
Nixon found that it took away, it tried to take away the President’s explicit Commander-in-Chief  
authorities that it undermined U.S. foreign policy, that it hurt our ability to act decisively and 
convincingly to respond to international crises, that it would hurt our relations with allies and make 
us look weak to our adversaries. It would make us unpredictable, because it depended on what 
Congress did or did not do. 
It also fails to require congressional action. So while the President is required to jump through 
hoops, Congress can just sit back and do nothing, and in the process make foreign policy. And that 
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is problematic for a host of  constitutional reasons, not least of  which is the founders envisioned 
chambers that would actually engage in thoughtful debate and discussion, and subject policies to 
critical examination, in order to move forward in terms of  our international relations. 
Nixon also felt that this undermined executive and legislative branch cooperation. I have less trouble 
with this because that’s exactly how the system was designed. It was for them not to get along, and 
this is precisely separation of  powers. And the division of  foreign affairs and war powers between 
the branches was supposed to be one of  the ways to keep the genie in check in terms of  this 
untrammeled power to take the country to war. 
LOU FISHER: Yeah, Dan asked how the War Powers Resolution is doing. We wouldn’t expect it 
to do very well, if  you think of  the history of  it. The Senate had a bill that was fairly tight. The 
President could act unilaterally, only on certain prescribed areas. 
The House never believed you could do that. The House didn’t think you could look down the road 
and see what to be done. So the House could only think of  certain reporting requirements, certain 
consultation requirements. So you had a very strong, from a congressional power standpoint, Senate 
bill and a weak House bill. 
Now, most of  the time, if  the House and the Senate differ- one is at 100 and one is at 80- you can 
do a 90, and no constitutional violation. But what came out of  Conference Committee on the War 
Powers Resolution was incoherent. Tom Eagleton was one of  the champions on the Senate side. He 
voted against it. He called what came out of  the Committee a bastard, a surrender. 
And just take a look at Section 2A. “It is the purpose of  this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of  
the framers of  the Constitution of  the United States, end insure that the collective judgment of  both 
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of  U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.” 
I think it would be hard for us to say that the framers intended to let the President use military force 
whenever he wanted to, for 60, 90 days, as far as ensuring collective judgment. No, you’ve already 
told the President, “You can do what you want by yourself.” So it was from the start, I think, a 
dishonest statute, and no one should expect it to be effective. 
DAN MARCUS: I think he doesn’t like the War Powers Resolution. 
[laughter] 
Sandy, you want to defend it a little or . . . ?
SANDRA HODGKINSON: Sure. 
LOU FISHER: There’re no typos in it! 
[laughter]
82 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 5, No. 2
SANDRA HODGKINSON: No, I’m certainly not going to defend it in that way. I would caveat 
that what we do certainly the current administration has been probably the friendliest in its rhetoric 
and its policy. But in fact, it also didn’t comply when it went into Libya. So even concluding that 
Libya wasn’t actually armed action, because the narrowness of  that bombing campaign …
LOU FISHER: At least after the 59th day. 
SANDRA HODGKINSON: Right.
DAN MARCUS: No hostilities. No hostilities.
SANDRA HODGKINSON: And ended up withdrawing before the 90 days, during the withdrawal 
period. I recognize that it’s moving in a direction, but I don’t candidly think that Republicans or 
Democrats alike are ever going to embrace it. But the question of  whether or not it works is . . . and 
whether or not there’s a healthy tension- certainly there is a meaningful role for Congress to play, 
through both the power of  the purse and through this historical Constitutional requirement for 
them to declare war. 
Since they don’t actually declare war any more, it would be helpful if  the Congress could be more 
responsible and more responsive when it comes to actual authorizations for the use of  military 
force. You’ll talk today about whether or not they’re nimble enough and responsive enough for us to 
be able to adapt an AUMF from those existing from 2001 and 2002, from Iraq and from the broader 
AUMF for this current war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, than whether or not they are able to 
adapt and respond in a way for us to address ISIL in a timely manner. 
I think that’s very much a live debate right now, which we’re going to see hearings, and hopefully 
see some action on. But the question is how long should it take? How much tension should there 
be? And if  there’s so much tension, do you at some point lose some of  the ability and strength of  
our military to actually respond to real-world threats in a timely enough manner, to try to effectively 
counter a threat? 
I think reasonable minds differ as far as that goes. So while there’s a role for healthy tension, it may 
not be too healthy right now because it’s just taking so long for the process to move forward. 
And candidly, neither the last administration or this administration has really wanted to work quickly 
with Congress to try to get new AUMFs, because the concern is that what you will get will be worse 
than what you already have. So why not use the old AUMF and contort it as much as you need to, to 
make it fit because that’s easier than going back and actually getting something new.
DAN MARCUS: Shoon. Let’s let Shoon have her innings first. 
SHOON MURRAY: I think that it’s hard to argue that it’s not flawed. It would be very hard to 
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argue. It’s never worked the way that it was meant to work. I’m sure that you all know that presidents 
do not consult generally, as they are supposed to, with the War Powers Resolution. Presidents report, 
but that report does not … they say that they are not reporting that troops armed for combat are 
actually going into hostilities, and so they don’t trigger the timetable. I think the timetable has been 
triggered or that the section of  the War Powers Resolution 4A1 has only been actually triggered one 
time. 
So it clearly doesn’t work as it was meant to work. Presidents have used force for long periods of  
time, as Clinton did in Bosnia. All of  that said though, I do think that the War Powers Resolution 
serves some function in that it gives a vehicle for the Congress to act against the President under 
certain circumstances, if  they can get a majority to do so. And it gives the President incentive to 
restrict uses of  force that have any intensity to 60 to 90 days. As you saw with Reagan in Grenada- 
out, he got out before it was over. Or Bush in Panama. 
So that there is a way in which it does serve to constrain the President and give a vehicle to 
Congress. So imperfect, yes, but perhaps better than nothing. 
DAN MARCUS: I’m going to call on you, Laura, but before that I’m going to cheat and comment 
a little myself, and say that I agree with Shoon. I think the War Powers Resolution is flawed; it 
has some Constitutional problems, but it has, I think, had an enormous and generally salutatory 
effect in sort of  placing boundaries- vague and general boundaries- on what presidents can do, and 
constraining their actions as a political matter. 
Because it’s hard . . . even if  a President thinks in his heart of  hearts that a statute is 
unconstitutional, it’s been there for 50 years now or whatever, and it provides a framework where 
presidents are careful. 
I think it’s one of  the reasons, among many, that the first President Bush, who didn’t want to, 
went to Congress to get an AUMF for the Gulf  War, and why the second President Bush went to 
Congress for the war on al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the Iraq war. So I think that it’s . . . it could 
be improved, I’m sure, and there are various proposals to tweak it. And maybe we’ll talk about them 
a little. 
But I think in general, yes, the framers may have thought there should be a complete separation 
between the War Powers of  Congress and the War Powers of  the President, but that doesn’t work 
in the modern world. It creates a framework for the two bodies, the two branches to deal with each 
other that I think is very valuable. Now, Laura, your turn. 
LAURA DONAHUE: I just don’t buy “This is a totally new world, we should encourage the 
President to go to war, and not see the Congress hindering that as anything but a bad thing. 
Therefore we should twist the AUMF, or the 2001 AUMF. That we should facilitate going to war 
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because there are a lot of  bad things out there, and we need to let the President do whatever the 
President wants to do.” There were arguments at the time of  the founding that said that giving this 
power to the Executive branch was a bad idea, and it was a bad idea for reasons that persist today. 
Despite the fact that we have cars and digitalization and internet, in a different modern context, the 
same issues apply. Do we want all the power- the great might of  the United States government, the 
most coercive powers available to us, to kill, to imprison, to hold people- do we want to give all that 
authority to one branch? And the answer is no, we do not, for the same reasons that the founders 
had at the time. They were aware, whether it was the beheading of  Charles I, the restoration of  
William and Mary to the throne, whether it was George III.
George III, the beheading of  Charles I was when William Penn was a child. They were well aware, 
the colonists and then the founders, of  the issues that accompanied tyranny. This is what the 
Federalist papers are about, about how to constrain that power, not to make it easier to use that 
power at will whenever something arises. 
I do want to also add that it’s not just about boots on the ground. So in Libya, the reason why the 
second part of  the WPR was not submitted is because, at that time, three quarters of  the sorties 
that were flown in Libya were by non-U.S. coalition partners, and all 20 ships were Canadian or 
European. So the White House issued a lengthy report saying that, “Even though we are not 
submitting a WPR to Congress, we want you to know that here’s why we’re not doing it.” 
The problem is that, that report basically represented a win by the State Department over the 
Department of  Defense, and particularly Harold Koh, who was ill, and his arguments that the 
administration should not submit a second report in this particular context, because we didn’t have 
boots on the ground. The framers weren’t just worried about blood, they were also worried about 
treasure. They were also worried about drawing the United States into conflicts that would make us a 
target and threaten us here at home.
And so this interpretation of  the WPR, the War Powers Resolution in the modern context, that 
says, “Well, it’s just about whether we have soldiers on the ground,” I think that is actually twisting 
the whole concept behind the division of  war powers, and reasons why even though, yes, we live in 
a different age, yes, things are different, but the same rationale that gave birth to the constitutional 
compromise is one that remains as relevant today as it was in 1787. 
DAN MARCUS: Yeah. One footnote- I haven’t read the Non-War Powers Report on Libya at the 
end of  the 60-day period or near the end. But it wasn’t just that there weren’t boots on the ground; 
it was that we weren’t conducting any military operations ourselves, right? We weren’t bombing 
anyone.
LAURA DONAHUE: We were providing the intelligence, we provided logistics, we provided the 
supplies. 
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DAN MARCUS: Yes, I understand. I’m not disagreeing with you.
LAURA DONAHUE: No, it was that we did not have active soldiers engaged in combat. 
DAN MARCUS: Right. 
LAURA DONAHUE: But that is only half  the story. It’s also about treasure. It’s about vulnerability. 
It’s about the risk you present then to U.S. national security, for other countries to attack us under 
rights of  self-defense, under Article 51 of  the U.N. Charter. It’s about a lot more than just whether 
we have soldiers on the ground, and that’s why this power has to be very carefully regarded and 
constrained. 
DAN MARCUS: Okay, Lou and then Sandy.
LOU FISHER: Yeah. War Powers Resolution, that is, in Section 8, two provisions, I think are in line 
with the Constitution. And one has to do with appropriations, because in the Vietnam War, part 
of  the litigation was that appropriations were an authorization. A lot of  judges believe that. And 
then you have a Don Wallace, attorney and Richard Fenno, a political scientist going to court and 
explaining to judges that Congress has two steps when it acts. And one is authorization, and after 
you authorize, then you appropriate. 
And with that, a lot of  those judges began to reverse, so the . . . what Section 8A says is that 
“Authority to introduce U.S. Forces . . . shall not be inferred from any provision of  law, including 
any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes . . . 
.” So that’s a good procedure. And that secondly shall not be inferred “From any treaty heretofore 
or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing . . . .” So 
that’s aiming at what happened in Korea, that the UN Charter does not authorize the President to 
act unilaterally. 
And then on Libya, the OLC, there was this memo, and it concluded that there was no war, partly 
for the reason that this was considered to be of  limited duration. It lasted seven months, but that 
was the OLC reasoning. And I’m wondering today as to legal analysis against the Islamic State, 
we have statements of  legality from the Defense Department. We have it from unnamed senior 
administration officials, about legality. 
We even have the White House Press Secretary talking about legality, and to my knowledge, we do 
not have one word from the Justice Department OLC. And I’m wondering if  they’re limited because 
of  what they said about limited duration, because the administration has already said this is going to 
go out years, probably until the next administration. So I think it’s extraordinary. 
DAN MARCUS: Presumably.
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LOU FISHER: No legal analysis from the Justice Department. 
DAN MARCUS: I think you’re right. If  it’s a war, it hasn’t been authorized by Congress unless the 
2001 AUMF or the 2002 AUMF authorizes it, and I assume if  there’s an OLC opinion, it relies on 
one or both of  those as statutory authorizations for the war. 
LOU FISHER: We don’t have anything, do we?
DAN MARCUS: From OLC? Not that we’ve seen, no. No, we haven’t, and we don’t.
LAURA DONAHUE: The Administration also started out in August of  this year saying it had 
Article II authority to do this. Then it backed down and in early September it said, “No, the 2001 
AUMF is our authority.” Two days later, they came out with another statement saying, “No, the 2002 
AUMF.” And now the President says, “Oh okay, I’ll go to Congress.” Like this kind of, “I’m going to 
do what I do and find a legal rationale later,” that’s not rule of  law. Like that’s not how it’s set up. 
SANDRA HODGKINSON: So this is where I kind of  want to jump back in because nobody, I 
think, would argue that the President should have unfettered desires to go and plunder the world 
and use our treasure, and rape and pillage. But at the end of  the day, when we’re looking at whether 
or not this War Powers Resolution is working, I think the- we’ve all said categorically, “No.” That 
doesn’t mean that presidents don’t see a tremendous value in getting AUMFs- authorization for the 
use of  military force. 
Having worked in both the last two administrations, I know that both administrations have sought 
to work with Congress to get authority for operations that they believed were in the self-defense 
interests of  the United States. The question comes that when they can’t, are they hamstrung? Or do 
they look to Article II to try to provide them with an opportunity to take those measures that they 
believe are necessary to defend and protect the nation? 
And it gets a lot harder when you go to missions that arguably don’t have that self-defense 
immediate nexus. When it comes to something that is more akin to a war of  aggression, which 
people argued in many cases, maybe Iraq was moving that it was too aggressive on a view of  self-
defense. And some look at humanitarian missions. While they are not boots on the ground in the 
same way, they are humanitarian, we’ll treat them separately. What if  the UN looks at other things? 
But when it comes to this, the crux of  the debate is, at the end of  the day, if  the President can use 
force in self-defense to protect the nation, even when the Congress fails to come through with a 
legitimate authority upon which the President can do so, what’s the legality of  that? And so that’s 
where the debate generally hits home. And when you look at now at ISIS, I think almost anyone on 
both sides of  this debate would argue that the authorities for 2001 and 2002 are not perfect. 
The Iraq authorization gives you some authority, potentially, to operate in Iraq; doesn’t give you 
anything for Syria. You look at the AUMF of  2001, and you’ve got al Qaeda and the Taliban- great, 
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where’s ISIL there? So it’s not perfect, but they are going to cobble through a patchwork to try to do 
what they think is necessary.
The question is, it would be great on all fronts if  Congress embraced their ability to work with 
the administrations on the AUMFs. And I think it’s become harder and harder to bridge that gap, 
because it’s just been difficult to get anything through in a timely enough manner. So I’m all for 
AUMFs bolstering the President’s authority, but the question is, “Can we get them through?”
DAN MARCUS: And the problem is not only that presidents worry that they can’t get from 
Congress what they want in an AUMF, but that Congress isn’t all that anxious to get into the play of  
deciding what the dimensions of  military action that it wants to authorize are, and they’d prefer not 
to take ownership of  the military action. That’s what’s playing out right now, I think. 
Just one word for the benefit of  some of  the students- there’ve been some references to the U.N. 
Charter and international law here, and it is very important, because the U.N. Charter, to which the 
United States is a party- it’s a treaty of  the United States; it’s the law of  the land- basically outlaws 
offensive war except when authorized by the Security Council. 
I’m over simplifying, but that’s basically right. But it does enshrine the traditional doctrine of  the 
right of  national self-defense. And what happened in the Iraq war, for example, was that the Bush 
Administration pushed- it’s fair to say pushed- the concept of  self-defense pretty far. 
And they developed this doctrine, published a nice paper on it, of  preemptive war and the notion 
that- which has some basis, I gather, in international law, which I don’t know much about—that if  
somebody is about to attack you, the doctrine of  self-defense permits you to preempt that attack. 
And that was the basic theory, I guess, under international law, for the Iraq war, that Saddam 
Hussein, we had reason to think, had weapons of  mass destruction that he might use to threaten us 
or our allies, or friendly countries. 
But the Bush administration, I think wisely decided that they . . . so I think their position, their 
legal position if  you ask Dick Cheney or David Addington surely, would have been they didn’t need 
any congressional authorization because this was preemptive self-defense. They just wisely decided 
they’d better get it. 
LOU FISHER: Just talking about the first Iraq war in 2000, I mean 1990, the Bush Administration 
went to the Security Council and got a resolution and claimed that was sufficient. And they argued 
within the administration they don’t have to come to Congress. Well, they eventually did. 
And then you have this messy situation where they come to Congress in January 1991, and it says 
authorization, and then Bush, when he signs, says, “I didn’t ask for authority, I asked for support.” 
But you signed, it says authorization. So we’ve been playing a lot of  games. 
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DAN MARCUS: Does everyone agree that Truman was wrong and Bush was wrong- that a Security 
Council resolution is enough? I think it’s pretty clear that Lou is right on that, that it isn’t enough 
under U.S. law. 
SANDRA HODGKINSON: I have heard people argue against it. 
DAN MARCUS: Under U.S. law. Yeah, it protects us under international law. 
LAURA DONAHUE: But it’s a matter of  constitutional law. So I’m a little bit confused as to why 
Congress’s decision not to authorize something means that there’s a system failure. That’s how it’s 
designed, right? So if  Congress says no, Congress says, “No. It’s not.” And then the President finds a 
way around it, right? That’s the constitutional design.
DAN MARCUS: What if  Congress says nothing?
LAURA DONAHUE: Well, okay, so now that’s getting to another question. So the framers, as an 
historical matter, the idea was you want them to engage in debate. So Congress to say, “Oh yes, 
President Obama needs an AUMF, and we’re going to go home and do reelection now.” That’s 
a failure of  Congress. That’s a failure to engage with the issues and debate it. But Congress, if  
engaging with the issues, decides not to pass an AUMF, that’s not a failure of  constitutional design 
or of  Congress, that’s exactly how the system is set up. 
And the response is not, “Okay, well, then I’ll find a way around this.” The response is, “That’s how 
it works. That’s for better or worse. We can amend the Constitution, but that’s how the Constitution 
works.” On the former point, I have a question for Lou, actually. I’m curious, because you looked to 
the appropriations clause. We’ve never discussed this, but I’m actually interested in your view as an 
historian on this. 
The appropriations clause- so Congress specifically put in the WPR that you cannot infer from 
appropriations that we agree with anything the administration is doing. But isn’t that an abdication 
of  congressional responsibility? Because isn’t the purse strings one of  the ways in which Congress 
is supposed to actually have a say in things? So isn’t this irresponsible, in a sense, for Congress, as a 
policy matter, to say, “Well, we are going to vote money for your war effort, but don’t read that as us 
supporting you in any way whatsoever.” 
LOU FISHER: Yeah, I think it’s a copout by Congress, but there was a lot of  litigation on that, and 
Congress was to make it clear. And I think it’s constructive that it’s written this way, that when we 
authorize war, we will say we authorize war, and not do it indirectly through funding. And then I was 
impressed, was it June or, this year, where the House voted 340 to 40 about the need for Congress to 
authorize what’s going on with the Islamic State. And also, I read the House and the Senate debates 
on continued resolution. 
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And I thought it was a very constructive, bi-partisan- not a partisan debate. And I thought it was 
pretty clear that members of  both parties felt that we don’t want, again, to do another Gulf  of  
Tonkin or one of  these have it forever. We’re going to do it on a short-term basis because we don’t 
have enough information now to authorize in an informed manner. So we’re going to do it on a 
short term. And I think that came out of  the continued resolution debate.
DAN MARCUS: Yes, and then they became irresponsible. None of  them are saying to the 
President, “You’d better stop, even though if  the 60-day, if  the War Powers Resolution applies, if  it’s 
not authorized by the earlier AUMFs, the war is illegal under the War Powers Resolution.” And yet 
none of  them is saying, “Send us an AUMF.”
SANDRA HODGKINSON: Right. So practically, what is the President supposed to do? Is he 
supposed to wait until they give him an AUMF, even though they are going to approve the funding, 
they’ll be sent to the Congress that you need to do something. There is a genuine threat that has 
been . . . that the President believes is a threat to Americans. Whether or not the Congress can 
actually get an AUMF written in a timely manner, the question is, “What should he do?” 
We can sit in this room and say it’s a shame, the President can’t be left alone to make these decisions, 
but if  he’s left alone to make these decisions, then he will be judged, and so will his party on what 
they have done. And no one has ever been held accountable for a violation of  the War Powers 
Resolution, even in the next administration. 
And so we can have this great debate, and Obama will act with or without Congress, depending on 
whether or not they get their act together, and give him what he needs. And my guess is, even if  he 
went beyond what some might argue is his authority, I don’t think he’ll ever be held accountable for 
it. 
DAN MARCUS: Shoon.
SHOON MURRAY: I think the honest thing to do would be to go to Congress with a very targeted 
AUMF, that he has written the first draft of, against ISIL. And I suspect if  he did so, it would be 
passed. And that would solve the problem. I think there are pretty big, from my perspective, there 
are some pretty big stakes involved with using the 2001 AUMF going forward. It’s what? Thirteen-
years old now, if  it’s used for this conflict, there’s no end in sight. And there are implications for 
the passage of  that authorization that were unforeseen.  It wasn’t such an authorization obviously 
as for Afghanistan, it’s an authorization for a shadow war that has been going on for a long time. 
There is lack of  transparency about where troops are, when they are involved in conflict. There’s 
lack of  transparency even about the targeted groups involved that we’re supposed to be at war with. 
So there are implications for Obama doing this reversal because he, himself, talked about wanting 
to repeal the 2001 AUMF and using this- this kind of- stretching the AUMF. So I guess what the 
President could do? He could write a targeted new authorization for ISIL in particular.
PROFESSOR MARCUS: Yeah, and I think- I would imagine- we’re all in agreement, and we 
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don’t want to get into the next panel, but that’s what should happen and both the President 
and Congress are to blame for not having faced up to the need if  we’re going to do this, which 
apparently everyone in Congress wants to do, and the President wants to do. They haven’t faced 
up to authorizing it in a rational way rather than making the President resort to a President who 
wants to be law abiding have to resort to these really strained arguments based on the 2001 and 
2002 AUMFs. Sort of  similar, just to come back to appropriations, this problem is similar to what 
happened in the Vietnam War, where Congress, for better or worse, did pass a statute authorizing 
military action to defend South Vietnam against North Vietnam. And then President Johnson 
and President Nixon ran with it to enlarge the war beyond what Congress contemplated although 
they didn’t write the thing very well. And it was, I think, the expansion of  the war. You mentioned 
the territorial issues, which I think is very important, it’s a big issue with the 2001 [AUMF] too. 
When Obama was running for President he said some things that led people to think that he might 
construe the 2001 AUMF as limited to military action in Afghanistan and maybe the border areas 
of  Pakistan. And he disappointed a lot of  people by adopting the Bush—the world is a battlefield—
with respect to these enemies’ approach. But in Vietnam, it was only after Nixon expanded the war 
into Laos and Cambodia that Congress really went berserk, and the way they tried to end the war 
was appropriations. They, ironically- not ironically I guess- that’s the only way under the constitution. 
I suppose you can argue the Declaration of  War clause implies a power of  Congress to say stop, to 
repeal the declaration and say stop. But It’s not clear; it’s the same issue about whether the President 
can withdraw us from a treaty without going to the Senate. But the Congress basically passed, as I 
recall, a law stopping appropriations for the Vietnam War as of  a certain date, Nixon vetoed it, and 
then they made a deal where Nixon said oh, I’ll end the damn war, give me six months, or something 
like that, and that was the deal. Is that right, Lou?
LOUIS FISCHER: That’s the nice example on appropriations because they cut off  funding and 
they didn’t have a two-thirds in each house to override and Elizabeth Holtzman, in the House, had 
gone to court and she not only got standing, but she won in district court. But after her victory in 
court and the judge- I thought it was a very good language- said “it cannot be the meaning of  the 
Constitution that the President can initiate a war in Cambodia and can continue it unless Congress 
can get a two-thirds in each house for an override.”  But then her victory was, of  course, pushed to 
the side because as Dan said the two sides agreed on, okay you can bomb another forty five more 
days and that’s it. But it was by appropriation battle.
SANDRA HODGKINSON: Sorry, I want to mention one more thing and, I apologize, I 
actually have to leave early. But I did want to say one thing about AUMFs and, I mean, I agree 
wholeheartedly that the right move is to get an AUMF, if  they can get one. What the AUMF gives 
the President is: one, it gives the legitimacy; two, it gives him a lot of  standing when he goes back 
to get funding from Congress for different aspects of  the war, and you don’t get caught up in the 
debate over whether it’s lawful or not lawful; and it makes it a lot easier to accomplish a lot of  
objectives. It gives legitimacy at home, and it gives legitimacy abroad. And so there, absolutely, is an 
extremely powerful role of  an AUMF, which is separate and apart from the question of  whether or 
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not it is legally required when a President is exercising Article II powers. And so I wholeheartedly 
think that a new AUMF in this particular case would benefit the President in a number of  ways. 
SHOON MURRAY: While sun-setting the old ones.
SANDRA HODGKINSON: I’ll let you take that one in the next panel.
LAURA DONOHUE: So there’s a distinction between the foreign- 
DAN MARCUS: Let me just say that Ms. Hodgkinson has to leave because something came up and 
a thank you very much for-
SANDRA HODGKINSON: It’s not a vote on the AUMF- wish it was.
DAN MARCUS: Go ahead Laura- 
LAURA DONONHUE: Yeah, so under a Youngstown analysis (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952)), foreign powers are divided. So from there you would look to whether you have 
a congressional authorization, whether Congress has not acted, or where Congress has explicitly 
forbidden something. For war powers, we’re in a different situation with regard to the Constitution; 
war powers are more clearly demarcated so that you need to go to Congress if  you want to have a 
declaration of  war outside of  repelling attack. You have to Congress for this. So the idea that you 
have to go to Congress for an AUMF- and it would be nice to have but we don’t need it- precisely 
the point of  the constitutional design, and I keep coming back to that. 
The 2002 AUMF- I do want to say something about that- in Iraq, because a few months before 
this administration appealed the 2002 AUMF to supplement the 2001 AUMF to supplement the 
Article II claims for ISIS and ISIL, the National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, actually wrote a letter 
to House Speaker John Boehner urging the house to repeal the 2002 AUMF. So she actually wrote 
in her a letter: “With American combat troops having completed their withdrawal from Iraq on 
December 18, 2011, the Iraq AUMF is no longer used for any U.S. governmental activities and the 
administration fully supports its repeal.  Such a repeal would go much further in giving the American 
people confidence that ground forces will not be sent into combat in Iraq.” This was less than two 
months before turning to the 2002 AUMF as an explanation, or a [legitimization], for bombing 
Syria, ISIS and ISIL. So I find this somewhat ironic that now this is being used this same AUMF 
that the administration said, “oh we no longer use it, we don’t need it, and it’s no longer relevant.” 
And now, robbed of  another opportunity to use the 2001 AUMF for the Article II authorities, that 
they would turn to that, and justification for that, is concerning. So, I agree with Shoon that in order 
to get constitutional authorization they have to go to Congress, and if  Congress says no, then the 
answer is, no. It was designed to prevent us from slipping into wars without us consciously moving 
to a state of  war. 
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DAN MARCUS: Yeah, Lou, you want to say something?
LOUIS FISCHER: Yea, on the 2002 AUMF, I don’t understand- maybe someone here does 
understand- why that should be any authorization for force against [the] Islamic State because 
the October 2002 Iraq resolution was passed because Iraq, according to the administration and 
according to Congress- they passed it- was a threat. That’s the language, “Iraq was a threat to the 
United States.” And it was a threat for reasons that we all know were bogus in terms of  weapons 
of  mass destruction, but I don’t understand how that that can relate at all to conditions today. 
Iraq is not a threat to the United States unless it’s badly dubbed into whatever it is, so what’s the 
connection? I don’t see any connection between the two.
DAN MARCUS: Well I don’t either, but we’re getting into the next panel; we probably shouldn’t do 
that. 
But I think weak as the arguments- whatever weaknesses the administration’s argument has based on 
the 2001 AUMF- their arguments based on the 2002 are much, much weaker. Shoon, would you like 
to comment on the 2001 AUMF? Which was a very unusual document because it didn’t specify who 
the enemy was except by inference and the wording of  it was very unusual for an authorization for 
military action. But apart from the ISIS issues over the last decade or so, there has been all sorts of  
difficult issues about how, particularly as al Qaeda has morphed into a sort of  franchising operation, 
and part of  the problem is we don’t have the information to judge the connectedness of  various 
terrorist organizations we’re now warring with to al Qaeda, and there’s a geographic issue. What do 
you see as the major problems with the 2001 AUMF as it’s been implemented?
SHOON MURRAY: Well, I’d have to divide that both historically and moving forward. Historically, 
what has been going so far, I see many problems with it; one, to look at how the two administrations 
interpreted it- they’ve interpreted it far beyond the intent the original intent. Bush interpreted it 
as equivalent to a declaration of  war; the Bush administration essentially saw it as: if  the Congress 
gives authority to use lethal force, then Congress has given the authority to do anything that has 
to do with fighting the war against al Qaeda- so interrogation, detention, surveillance, military 
commissions- and without going back to Congress. So the scope that the [Bush] administration 
interpreted it was very, very broad. And it got pushed back by the Supreme Court, of  course, in 
terms of  military commissions. And- 
DAN MARCUS: Yes- 
SHOON MURRAY: Yes, and also they used it to justify the NSA surveillance, the domestic 
surveillance, because surveying people is part of  war. And so it was interpreted very broadly. 
The Obama administration has also interpreted it beyond intent, beyond the congressional intent, 
by interpreting it as applying to emergent movements, not just those with the nexus to 9/11 
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immediately. And that’s been controversial. And now extending it to ISIS or ISIL when the Obama 
administration itself  gave the criteria for what the associates of  al Qaeda would be, and essentially 
disregarding their own definitions by extending it to ISIL, I think, has expanded the scope.
LOUIS FISHER: Yea ISIL is the interesting question because it’s pretty clear since ISIL has been 
excommunicated by al Qaeda, by al Qaeda central, it’s hard to argue that they are part of  al Qaeda or 
even an associated force. And apparently the theory is that, well they have their origins in al Qaeda 
and that’s enough, is that basically it?
SHOON MURRAY: Or that there has been past association, so it’s not current association.
DAN MARCUS: Yes.
SHOON MURRAY: But I guess, to go back to something that Harvey said at the very beginning, 
just to have a sense of  how far we have come and this isn’t going to be popular in the current 
context, but the 2001 authorization gives the President an awesome power to be able to use lethal 
targeting anywhere in the world- if  they can make some sort of  connection to al Qaeda. So that, to 
me, is tremendous. I mean that’s something that, over time, we need to rethink. We shouldn’t just 
go forward [with that]. That [authorization] was designated because of  a particular conflict, and 
if  there is a need for using it in the future, it should be specified as the threats evolve, so you have 
new threats, you have new targets, and you have new authorizations if  you need them, but don’t just 
give this power carte blanche to the President for going forward. And that’s certainly not what the 
Congress intended at the time; they intended it to have a specific nexus to the perpetrators of  the 
attack to 9/11.
DAN MARCUS: Let me turn that to a broad question, which is: does the whole war paradigm work 
for the conflict with non-state terrorist organizations like al Qaeda? In other words, do we need to 
revisit the decision made by the Bush administration, and reinforced by the Obama administration, 
to treat our conflict with al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that target Americans abroad, 
or here, as a war rather than as a criminal justice problem? The rest of  the world has never really 
bought into that theory of  ours. And does our experience with the AUMF show that the war 
metaphor, the war paradigm, for our conflict with terrorist organization just is the wrong one? 
LOUIS FISHER: This is a bit of  a stretch, but we did have our problems with the Barbary pirates, 
and you can connect them to various states along North Africa. But there’s another good example 
where Jefferson went into the Mediterranean and there were military activities, but he came back 
to Congress in December 1801 and said this is what I did in the Mediterranean. And then he said, 
“Beyond the line of  defense I cannot go.” And anything of  an offensive nature, I need authorization 
from Congress. And Congress passed ten statutes authorizing Jefferson and Madison to use force 
against the Barbary pirates. So in a way, we have the so-called tributes, the bribes of  the Barbary 
pirates. That’s not exactly current terrorism, but it’s maybe a connection there.
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DAN MARCUS: It’s more of  a one-shot thing, and the terrorist. 
LOUIS FISHER: Gone on for long a long time. 
DAN MARCUS: Well that’s true, Laura did you want to add something?
LAURA DONONHUE: Yes. So I don’t think it’s entirely true that nobody in the world has ever 
treated terrorism in a military context—so if  you think of  the L.T.T.E., the Tamil Tigers, Sri Lanka, 
if  you think of  the Algerians, separatists and French actions in Algeria, if  you think of  various 
national separatists, religious or political, like the anarchists movement the turn of  the last century, 
you know there are various ways in which terrorism has been treated. Even Clinton sent missiles to 
the Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant following the World Trade Center. So this idea that it’s entirely 
new, it’s unprecedented, nobody’s ever done this- yes, other people do this. In fact, the same five 
techniques that we used in Guantanamo Bay, [that] have come under fire, were used against the 
nationalists in Northern Ireland in the early nineteen seventies. And the case went to the European 
Court of  Human Rights, called Ireland v. United Kingdom (Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980)), where hooding, wall-standing, sleep deprivation, and food and water 
deprivation came under fire. And in that case, Britain said, look we don’t want to give these 
individuals prisoner of  war status we don’t want to treat this as a war because it legitimates their 
cause. But in that case, they did dispense with these five techniques when they were brought up on 
it, and the Gardner commission later reported. So this idea that, ok, we never treat terrorists in a 
military context, we do. But to the extent that by doing so we lose our ability to use our criminal 
justice system I think that’s where we really suffer. So the idea that, for instance, we can’t use Article 
III courts to try terrorists when we’ve had over nine-hundred successful convictions or merge our 
way when Southern District of  New York successfully prosecuted twenty-six out of  twenty-six 
jihad conspirators prior to 9/11. The idea that we can’t use the criminal justice system, I think, that’s 
where we become particularly hampered; I do want to respond to one point that Shoon raised, 
which is surveillance in the AUMF. So the terrorism surveillance program that President Bush 
put in to place, as it became public by 2005-2006 there was an effort to move it into the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act and end certain aspects of  that program. So while the 2001 AUMF was 
initially used to justify the surveillance programs, it subsequently transferred to FISA and then with 
the FISA Amendments Act in 2008 Section 702, dealing with international communications, it now 
is being treated under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and not under the 2001 AUMF. So, 
just an addendum to your point.
DAN MARCUS: Yes, and while the Supreme Court has brought up the Bush administration up 
short on military commissions, and while the Bush administration’s position on the NSA program 
was clearly wrong, the Supreme Court did bless the idea that the AUMF did authorize the President 
to do the kinds of  things you do in a war in the Hamdi case (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 
S. Ct. 2633, 159 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2004)), where they upheld detention, not surveillance, of  enemy 
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combatants. They would not come out the same way on surveillance because of  the FISA statute 
LAURA DONONHUE: Where Congress said this is the only way intelligence could be collected.
DAN MARCUS: Right, I think you’re right about your examples about terrorism, although most 
of  those would fit more easily into international law conception of  internal rebellions or civil 
wars. What’s unique about the current war that began in 2001 with the AUMF, as its since been 
interpreted, is that we are sort of  following this enemy, this stateless enemy, that is not operating 
within just one country, they’re operating all over the world, and we’re asserting the right to go after 
them wherever they are, and defining them in a pretty broad way. Yes, Lou?
LOUIS FISHER: This is an appropriation question again, I don’t see any mention of  what I am 
going to say in newspapers or online- maybe it is out there. But when you look at the continuing 
resolution, the last section has to do with the equipping and training vetted elements from Syria. 
And it’s interesting how their funded because there is no appropriation. The Defense Department 
has to get unobligated money that it has and, interestingly, foreign governments can give money to 
the Defense Department. And then the Defense Department comes back- the continuing resolution 
explains- it comes back to certain designated committees for notification and approval. And I think 
it is a very strange operation. That same issue came up in 1990 where the Bush administration did 
go abroad and got huge commitments. And about 80% of  the Iraq war in 1990-91 was paid by other 
countries- Japan and Germany and so forth. But that money, according to the Bush administration, 
was going to go to the Defense Department, and Senator Byrd said no, no, no, it’s not going to 
the Defense Department; it’s going to go to the Treasury Department to be appropriated out by 
Congress. So there was that battle back in 1990 on Congress protecting itself  and the appropriation 
process. And then we have this very strange language, I think, in the Continuing Resolution that 
became law in September 19, and it will expire December 2011. I think it’s a very unconstitutional 
process of  letting other countries give money to the Defense Department, and then you go certain 
committees and spend it. 
DAN MARCUS: Yeah, it’s a new kind of  legislative authority. I do want to open it up to questions 
from the audience, but one last question to the panel about war powers resolution, which I seem to 
like better than most of  the panelists, but . . .
LOUIS FISHER: You gave it a five?
DAN MARCUS: Yeah, I give it a five; you can give it a minus two. The War Powers Resolution has 
proven, despite the skepticism of  presidents, remarkably resilient. It’s still there and, as one of  the 
panelists mentioned, Obama purports to be a big supporter of  it and purports to want to comply 
with it, even if  he has to twist himself  into a pretzel to do so. But if  the War Powers Resolution is, 
is it really just a bad idea because we ought to just stick with the constitution? Or, if  it’s not working 
as well as it should, how should it be fixed up? How would you improve it? Are there some ways in 
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which it could be made to work better? Yes, Shoon?
SHOON MURRAY: The ideas on how to improve it, I think, are pretty clear and lot of  people have 
given them before. You have to have some sort of  consultative body set up in Congress that the 
President can go. Have the leadership of  Congress stand-by to be consulted in times before the use 
of  force. You’ve have to define hostilities; you would have to, perhaps, have a way to have forced 
Congress to act, rather than rely upon inaction. So there are clear ways to make this a better law, 
I think. The problem is that it was passed in a very unusual circumstance when there was a lot of  
anger at the executive branch, which would allow the Congress to pass the legislation over veto. And 
I don’t think you have the circumstances to amend it. I don’t think, politically, you could get anything 
passed. And so you have an imperfect law that I suspect we’ll have to live with because there is no 
way to change it, so you just acknowledge the imperfections and go forward.
DAN MARCUS: Lou and then we’ll go forward
LOUIS FISHER:  The Center had a proposal for a committee and a Senator McCain has a similar 
bill on it. I don’t like that process because the way it would work is you would give confidential 
information to a twenty-person committee. And it would come on the floor and the people, all 
of  the members of  Congress, wouldn’t have access to such information. So I don’t like that at 
all. I think the War Powers Resolution, if  it were ever amended, I think Section 8, there’s very 
constructive material there. I think the incoherence and dishonesty, Section 2(a), could be removed 
because I don’t think this has anything to do with protecting the intent of  the framers or insisting on 
collective action. 
DAN MARCUS: Laura.
LAURA DONONHUE: Yeah, so I agree completely on the historical point with regard to 2(a), it’s 
just inconsistent, it’s just its own revisionist history, which has no basis in any historical document 
whatsoever. So I would also say 2(c) as an unconstitutional infringement and statement of  the 
President’s Commander-in-Chief  authorities, as well as Section 5. I think Section 5 infringes in some 
ways on the Commander-in-Chief  authority. For instance, it forces the Commander-in-Chief, even 
when repelling attack, to stop the attack after ninety days. If  we are repelling an attack and Congress 
has not actually blessed it but with a name, as they say, in The Prize Cases, the President can still 
repel that attack, right? So I think these are fairly significant constitutional grabs at power by the 
legislature over the executive. 
With that said, what we’re seeing and what happens is it goes the other way too. This is the back in 
forth that we see with regard to war powers and foreign affairs powers. So this consultative process 
is my concern as well as one of  deference to them because we saw this with the NSA, with the 2008 
FAA, which was the FISA Amendments Act, amending FIDA to include Section 702, 703, and 704. 
What happened was the rest of  Congress deferred to the intelligence committees and said that they 
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know what’s going on. So when they came up for renewal, everybody voted for it without actually 
walking down the hall, going inside a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) and 
look at how content in PRISM was being collected upstream of  data collection. Because it is pretty 
clear, at this point, the DNI (Director of  National Intelligence) made this information available 
to all of  Congress, and they simply did not live up to their responsibilities. And I am seeing this 
increasingly in Congress. That’s why that appropriations question- ways in which Congress is not 
fulfilling the role that it was envisioned it would fulfill at the time of  the founding. 
I don’t know the fix for that because all of  this, that scheme you present, you suggest, we know that 
this is something that has been proposed, it relies on congressional members doing what they’re 
supposed to do when they’re elected. And it relies on a system where political party overrides don’t 
occur in the legislature. You know it’s as Federalist 51, James Madison, where ambition must be 
made to counter ambition, you have to actually lodge significant power and have individuals willing 
to act on that power in those positions. And I think that’s a bigger question and of  really deeper 
concern for the constitutional design.
DAN MARCUS: Yeah, I think that our history shows that while an ideal world, every congressman 
would be fully informed on everything and vote instead of  spending all day raising money and so 
on, that the realities of  modern Congress and, not just the last few years but the last 50, 75 years 
show that the full Congress has to delegate to committees, and to smaller groups, certain functions 
as a matter of  being effective. 
Now whether it works- in the covert action area, Congress did, by statute, establish a system where 
the President was made accountable and was required to approve all covert action by the CIA and 
other intelligence agencies. And he also was required to report to the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees or, in sensitive things, the so-called “Gang of  8” before he does it. If  it’s practical, 
and if  not, right afterwards. And that system hasn’t worked perfectly by any means, but it’s, I think 
it is perhaps a model for the kind of  thing that might make consultation under the War Powers 
Resolution work more effectively and might push presidents to do more consultation. 
Supposedly, Ronald Reagan, I think it was when he was bombing Libya actually, some of  you in 
the room are too young to remember that, but after there was an attack on a nightclub in Berlin 
frequented by U.S. service men and women and several were killed, I think- Ronald Reagan launched 
attacks on Libya, and he complied with the War Powers Resolution consultation requirement by 
inviting a few congressional leaders into the Oval Office the night he was launching the plane and 
not letting them out of  the oval office until the planes were on their way. But I do think there might 
be some room for strengthening consultation mechanisms. The other interesting thing- that repelling 
attacks point that the War Powers Resolution, perhaps unconstitutionally, prevents a President from 
repelling, or continuing to repel the attack after the sixtieth day unless Congress says okay, but one 
of  the difficult questions under war powers is presumably the inherent authority of  the President, 
as blessed by the framers, to repel sudden attacks on the United States doesn’t last forever. For 
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example, if  during the Cold War, Soviet missiles had been launched against the United States, no one 
would have said that the President had to go to Congress before he sent our missiles up to intercept 
the Russian missiles. On the other hand, if  that resulted in a full-fledged war, you couldn’t use the 
repelling attacks authority forever. And one thing, I guess, there is no answer to is: at what point 
does a President who has lawfully constitutionally responded to an attack on the United States lose 
that authority and has to go to Congress? And I don’t know. I don’t think there’s any answer to that 
but if  anyone has thoughts on that.
LOUIS FISHER: We talked about that earlier that both Franklin Roosevelt and George W. Bush 
could have argued there has been a sudden attack and I can respond, but they both had the 
judgment to come and had to be a joint exercise of  power.
SHOON MURRAY: This question is different; this question is when do you lose the ability? When 
does it end? And just to add to that, when do AUMFs end? 
DAN MARCUS: Yes, that’s right, when does an AUMF or a declaration of  war end?
SHOON MURRAY: Does it end when the conflict is over? Or can they continue on forever?
DAN MARCUS: Yeah, that’s right. Well, in the old days, war has an end with surrender and/or a 
peace treaty- wars and nation states- today, when will the war against al Qaeda end? 
SHOON MURRAY: Or the 2002- 
DAN MARCUS: Well yeah, that, we thought, was over, right? Okay, let’s open up to questions or 
comments from the floor. And go to one of  the microphones and tell us who you are, and then say 
your piece. Hopefully a question- 
QUESTION: Hi, my name is Cynthia Anderson, and I actually had a question for Professor 
Donohue. In response to the question you answered, Professor Marcus, about whether we should 
be using military or criminal means to deal with the terrorist threat, you mentioned that there is 
historical precedence for using military force, but that we’ve also had success with using criminal 
prosecutions to deal with the terrorists as well. And I was wondering if  you have any thoughts on 
whether this is, or how much complexity, that adds to the constitutional question of  surveillance 
when you add in criminal prosecutions in regards to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and 
the use of  that in the prosecution.
LAURA DONONHUE: Okay, so great. Thanks, great question. So actually, I have a two-part 
series on Harvard Journal of  Law and Public Policy, on Sections 215 and 702 that address the 
constitutional questions. And one of  them is 180 pages and one is 210 pages. So the short answer 
is that there are a lot of  constitutional complications, and one of  the reasons for this is—I 
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actually think a Youngstown analysis is relevant in the foreign affairs capacity. So when you’re 
collecting intelligence for foreign affairs purposes, whether Congress has spoken on that, has some 
constitutional meaning under Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown. That is if  Congress has actively 
said you have permission to do “X” then and this comports with the Fourth Amendment then 
you have permission to do “X” and it comports. So to the extent that, for instance, in Section 702, 
programmatic collection was anticipated by Congress [and] the words support it, then that looks like 
a congressional grant of  authority to collect that foreign intelligence. 
Now the question is, is at what point (as opposed to Section 215, which is the collection of  
telephony metadata, where the statute requires that there be reasonable grounds to believe that the 
information is relevant to an authorized investigation and the argument is, actually, that all telephony 
metadata is relevant to terrorism investigations; therefore, we’re going to collect everybody’s 
telephony metadata). Okay, that’s just a bastardization of  the statutes’ true language; that is not 
within what Congress very clearly said. The FAA, the 2008 FAA—it looks pretty clear from the 
language that, in fact, in the debates, congressional members stood up and said, “this is a problem; 
this allows for programmatic collection.” Okay, so now the question is so what if  you want to use 
this for criminal prosecutions? What has come out lately, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board has issued two reports: one on 215 and one on 702. In the 702 report, they revealed for 
the first time that the FBI takes data accumulated through foreign intelligence gathering (so both 
702 and 215), puts it into one database, and then for totally unrelated criminal activity, queries that 
database to see if  they can get any information that would be helpful. Now, at no point is there 
a warrant for 702 data. You haven’t gone before a court, you don’t go before a FISC (Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court) for everybody, there’s no probable cause if  the individual is a foreign 
power or [an] agent of  a foreign power, as there is for traditional FISA. There’s no probably cause 
that could use the facilities to be placed under surveillance; instead, it is the broad collection of  
information on citizens, generally, that’s being collected. So, as a criminal matter, you can raise a 
Fourth Amendment use challenge and say “look the Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect 
people and you have a reasonable expectation that the government is not going to go around and 
collect all your information and then look for possible evidence of  criminal activity and then bring 
criminal prosecution.” 
So you can’t use foreign intelligence to do an end-run around Forth Amendment criminal 
protections that one would otherwise have. And what supports this, historically, is general warrants, 
at the time of  the founding, were condemned- that this is what the British government was using 
against the colonists. William Pitt directed that the colonial governors to use general warrants against 
U.S. colonists, the colonist objected, James Otis, in one of  the most famous orations, said that, “This 
is the very instrument of  tyranny.” And then and there, John Adams later wrote that then and there 
the child of  liberty was born. That’s when the revolution really started, objecting to the warrants. 
So when it came time to write the Bill of  Rights, the reason that Virginia and New York wouldn’t 
actually sign the Constitution was that it didn’t include a bill of  rights. And it was on the condition 
that this clause would be included, in part, that they actually joined the Constitution- putting it to 
effect. So the Fourth Amendment, the reasonable expectation of  privacy, is precisely, or the right 
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of  the people to be secured in their person’s, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and 
seizure shall not be violated. That’s the language of  the Fourth Amendment; that right is referring 
to the concept of  general warrants. So the idea that we could use foreign intelligence, to have a 
general warrant, that allows for the collection of  all this information and looking for potential 
criminal activity, and then use it in the criminal context- that, to me, raises very serious constitutional 
concerns. 
DAN MARCUS: I would just add, that still, the Supreme Court has never ruled on any of  this stuff- 
the constitutional question. So even the basic question of  whether evidence obtained through a 
classic FISA warrant from the FISA court for foreign intelligence purposes can be can be used in a 
criminal trial has not been answered by the Supreme Court. The FISA court of  review has said it’s 
okay, in dictum I guess, am I wrong?
LAURA DONONHUE: So the courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of  traditional 
FISA.
DAN MARCUS: Of  getting the data, yes. But the Supreme Court hasn’t said whether you can use 
evidence obtained in a FISA, from a FISA warrant based on probable cause to think a guy is an 
agent of  a foreign power, which is a different, lesser, probable cause. It’s not probable cause to think 
he’s committed a crime. [The] Supreme Court has never answered the question of  whether even the 
classic FISA warrant evidence can be used in a criminal trial. Yeah.
QUESTION: Yes, my name is Mark Nevit, I am a Navy attorney. Professor Dononhue, I very much 
share your concerns about Congress’ role in all this. I guess my question for the panel is- the courts 
have been reluctant to get involved in the President’s authority. I believe in 2000, Congressman 
Campbell challenged the President over Clinton’s actions. I believe the District Court of  the District 
of  Columbia refused to take the case- for, I think, either political pressure or something- I forget 
exactly what it was. But they haven’t been involved in sort of  adjudicating these matters that define 
the outer contours of  the AUMF. And these are critically important matters that are facing us. So if  
the courts don’t get involved it seems like the tie goes to the President. President Clinton is able to 
do what he wants to do. Would you like to see more of  a role for the courts in deciding this? And 
what would that role be? It seems these are really fundamental problems and I’m worried about the 
tie being in the President’s hands with the courts not engaging.  
LOUIS FISHER: Well let me, you know, sometimes the court gets involved in national security 
matters- Hirabayashi (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)) and Korematsu (Toyosaburo 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944))- and we regret it. I am surprised after 9/11 how 
quickly the courts did push back against the administration. And I think a part of  that: April 2004 
Paul Clemente from the solicitor general’s office was arguing the two Padilla (Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 
U.S. 426, 427 (2004)), Hamdi cases. And throughout that day, justices asked him,
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“How do you treat detainees?” “Do you torture them?” 
“No, we don’t torture them. That would be against the law; we have a treaty against that.” 
“Do you torture them?” 
“No, you don’t get good information that way.”
“Do you torture them?” 
“No if  anyone did that, we’d prosecute them.”
“Do you torture them?”
All throughout the day- so that evening, I suppose a lot of  you know what went around the world- 
photographs of  Abu Ghraib. So I think, not that Paul Clemente lied or deceived the Court, he 
didn’t know what’s going on in the Justice Department. And I think that made the court much more 
assertive both in Hamdi and Rasul (Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)) and eventually in Hamdan 
(Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
DAN MARCUS: Lauren?
LAURA DONONHUE: Yeah, so I’d like to take a shot at that too. So, it’s funny because the 
cases you mentioned, what comes to my mind are Ex parte Milligan (Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 
(1866)), Youngstown, New York Times (New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)), the 
Pentagon Papers case. There are plenty of  times where the courts have stepped forward and had a 
stance and said something when national security matters were on the line. So why the reluctance 
now to deal with either substance or due process or procedural questions; why the reluctance to deal 
with this point in time of  some of  the - well actually, the surveillance issues can explained partially 
by statutory change and there are two cases that are working their way through the courts right now. 
There are many, many cases but two in particular that are now at appellate court level where the 
courts below us come out differently, so I think the court will be forced to, at least, take on at least 
some of  the surveillance issues and deal, particularly if  there is a split between the circuits once it 
goes to the appellate level. 
As far as politics question doctrine, I also want to mention state secrets doctrine. And particular 
because you are a military JAG (Judge Advocate General). So, I have been very surprised, one of  
the big concerns during the earlier years of  the Bush administration was that the administration 
was using state secrets differently from other administrations with regard to national security cases 
coming up in the context of  the AUMF and the war against al Qaeda, post 9/11. And one of  my 
concerns at the time was that everyone was looking at these five to seven published judicial opinions 
and drawing conclusions about how the executive branch is actually using them. They’re not actually 
looking at the executive branch, which you know, is not rocket science. It’s kind of  an obvious thing, 
why don’t you look at how it’s actually being used. And when I looked at state secrets, what I found 
by looking at totally unusual documents that aren’t usually used in research; instead, I just went to 
see how many times state secrets privileges had been claimed as an affirmative defense and how 
many times the government had stepped in to support this claim. 
102 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 5, No. 2
I found more than 250 cases and that same intervening period that had involved state secrets and 
what was happening was that state secrets had become a form of  private indemnity to contractors 
and particularly military contractors that were using state secrets to get out of  patent disputes, 
personal injury and wrongful death suits, against soldiers to get out of  environmental matters, to out 
of  all sorts of  things and the courts, as soon as the government said state secrets, they would back 
off  without even looking at the information to the point where tens of  thousands of  pages would 
overnight be called state secrets. And the courts would not look at any of  the evidence. They’d just 
say, “Okay, as long as you’re claiming state secrets.” So what I saw was this pattern of  the judiciary 
being unwilling to engage when national security matters were on the line and I saw it in state 
secrets. You see it in political questions, [and] this is concerning. That is their role and we might be 
seeing more of  that now; now there are a lot more cases coming through the courts, and I hope 
there will be because we can point to many examples in history, Ex parte Milligan. You can point to 
Youngstown, you can point to Pentagon Papers, where the courts have had an important role to play 
and really must perform that function. 
DAN MARCUS: Yeah.
LOUIS FISHER: Very quickly, on state secrets, that’s a terrible decision, Reynolds (United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)), absolutely incoherent decision saying- we’ll never abdicate to executive 
caprice.” Which is exactly what they did—they decided the case without looking at the accident 
report. 
When the Obama administration came in, I think the message was that the Bush administration 
had mislead the state secrets privilege, so in September 2009, the Justice Department put out a 
new procedure to be scrubbed a little bit more. But I’m not sure there’s any difference between the 
two administrations and you even have cases that Lauren knows all about. There’s a woman put on 
the “no-fly list” and been in [court for] ten-years, and it turned out she got put on the no fly list 
because an FBI agent marked the wrong box and you found that out in court. So it’s amazing that 
Eric Holder will sign declarations to stop those cases from going forward. So it is a nightmare for 
executive abuse and very few courts [are] pushing back. 
DAN MARCUS: Let me just say one quick thing on that and that is while I think the courts and 
the Supreme Court will continue to defer to executive branch judgments as to when the national 
security is threatened and so on- I think this court, the Supreme Court, is a very confident court, 
and I think they will have shown an increasing willingness to wade into disputes between Congress 
and the President. And this current case in the Supreme Court, the Zivotofsky case, on the status of  
Jerusalem in U.S. passport policy- the D.C. Circuit said, “we’re not going to get into it; let Congress 
and the President fight it out; it’s a political question.” And the Supreme Court said, “No, Congress 
said this and the President said that; we got to decide it.” 
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QUESTION: Is this working? 
DAN MARCUS: Yes. 
QUESTION: Okay, so I have one last question, and I am afraid it’s probably going to be the last one 
for this panel so we can transition to our 4:30 panel. So my apologies on that one, everyone’s been 
wonderful so far. 
So it was said before, and I forget by who, that the War Powers Resolution somewhat undermines- 
so at least this is the administration’s policy- that it undermines the Commander-in-Chief ’s powers 
of  the executive branch. And I have a bit of  a hard time understanding that because if  anybody 
takes a look at Article II, you see clearly that the President is not endowed with any specific war 
powers whatsoever. And I think, if  anything, the War Powers Resolution grants the President war 
powers. It’s not specifically telling him how to run his Army and Navy as Commander-in-Chief, but 
it certainly tells him when he can and cannot use it. So taken in that context, I am just wondering 
what the response is to anybody who would pose that argument might be? Thank you.
LOUIS FISHER: Oh, I would agree. Just briefly, it does expands presidential power if  there’s no one 
who would believe before that presidents could go to war anytime they want for sixty, ninety days 
for any reason. 
LAURA DONONHUE: So I agree with that, on the other side of  it, can Congress tell the President 
in the middle of  repelling the attack, you have to stop when you’re Commander-in-Chief  and it’s 
very clear is that this was the design. If  we’re under attack if, our actual territory is under attack, 
and the President is repelling that attack, this comes up in Prize; this comes up in many contexts. 
The President has the inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief  to repel that attack. So can 
Congress then come in and say, “No you don’t have that authority; you have to stop using it even 
if  we don’t have to do anything, but after 60 days you have to stop.” So that’s where there is this 
unconstitutional abridgement, one could argue, of  the President’s authorities.
At the same time, that the idea he would have sixty days to start an attack anywhere in the world is a 
radical expansion of  the concepts, so both can be true.
DAN MARCUS: Well, with that let me thank our distinguished panel for a very interesting 
discussion.
104 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 5, No. 2
105Fall 2014 SympoSiumVol. 5, No. 2
FALL AUMF SYMPOSIUM PANEL 2: THE AUMF’S 
RELEVANCE TO THE CURRENT MILITARY 
OPERATIONS AGAINST ISIS
STEPHEN VLADECK: Ok. So we are going to get started with panel number two. The second and 
last panel of  the symposium. So as you have probably figured out by now, the focus of  this panel is 
more specifically on the current threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. I am going 
to try to commandeer the ISIL, instead of  ISIS, for our panel, but we’ll see if  people, you know, slip 
away from that.
So basically, the threat posed by ISIL, the current and existing legal authorities for the U.S. to use 
force against ISIL, and what Congress could, should, and will do, in the coming days, weeks, months, 
and years when it comes to ISIL and AUMFs more generally. And to answer these questions, among 
others, we’ve really assembled a fantastic panel, that includes, I’ll just introduce them briefly, you 
have their full information in your lovely packets, but in alphabetical order starting to my immediate 
right, is Andrew Borene, who is a counselor at Steptoe and Johnson, who is an adjunct professorial 
lecturer here at AU, a former Associate Deputy General Counsel for the Department of  Defense, 
a Marine Intelligence Officer from Iraq, his J.D. is from the University of  Minnesota Law School, 
his B.A. is from Macalester, so cold weather to him, is you know, nothing. So Andrew thank you for 
coming.
To his right is Andrew Carswell, who is the Senior Delegate to the Canadian and U.S. Armed Forces 
for the International Committee of  the Red Cross. Prior to his tenure at ICRC, Andrew was an 
officer in the Canadian Armed Forces Office of  the Judge Advocate General. And before that, a 
criminal prosecutor in Calgary- go Flames- also I guess, cold weather, so I guess, that’s the moral 
of  the story is relatively small colleges and cold weather enthusiast. That’s our panel. Andrew has a 
master’s degree from the University of  Geneva in the Graduate Institute of  International Studies, 
his law degree is from Cardiff  University, and his undergraduate degree is from McGill- more cold 
weather- so thank you, Andrew, for coming.
To Andrew’s right is Daphne Eviatar, who’s Senior Counsel for National Security at Human Rights 
First. She is also an award-winning journalist who has written widely about law, national security, 
and human rights. And she is one of  the founding editors of  the Just Security blog, but I am biased. 
Daphne is a graduate of  the Columbia University Graduate School of  Journalism, the NYU School 
of  Law, and Dartmouth College- more cold weather- and clerked for the Honorable Dolores 
Sloviter on the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Third Circuit. Actually Judge Sloviter, also happens to 
often hire one of  our alums to clerk, so very cool.
And finally, last but not least, is my good friend Charles “Cully” Stimson. Cully is the manager of  
the National Security Law Program and is a Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He 
served as the Deputy Assistant Security of  Defense- DASDY- for detainee affairs during the Bush 
Administration. He is a trial lawyer, and civilian and military prosecutor, and still a military trial 
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judge today, with a ton of  experience on these questions. Cully’s law degree is from George Mason 
University School of  Law, and he graduated from Kenyon College undergrad- not quite as cold 
weather, but, you know, not balmy- so Cully, thank you for coming. And let me also just note: we 
were also supposed to be joined by Ms. Karen Corrington, who works for Senator Tim Kaine, but 
apparently the Senate is actually working today. Who knew? Something new and different for the 
113th Congress. So Karen sends her regrets, and we’ll try to project, I guess, on her behalf.
Anyways, to the four of  you, thank you all so much for coming. And our format is going to be much 
like the first panel: I am going to ask a bunch of  loaded, sometimes rhetorical questions of  our 
panelists, and we’ll see how that goes. So, Andrew Borene, I am going to start with you.
Before we get to the legal fight, and the legal debate about ISIL, can you say a bit about ISIL, about 
why this seemed to come out of  nowhere, about what the threat is, what we know and what we 
don’t know.
ANDREW BORENE: Sure, well unfortunately right now, there remain a lot of  unknowns—known 
unknowns—about ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh, whatever we are choosing to call them, or they 
are trying to identify themselves as. I’ll start with the history, and how there’s a nexus with al Qaeda, 
because I think it is relevant to this AUMF debate. So prior to 9/11, a fellow named Abu Musab 
al-Zarkawi was busy starting a unity in jihad terrorist group in the Middle East. After 9/11, after 
the U.S. invasion of  Iraq, he saw an opportunity to expand his operations and oppose the crusader 
army in Iraq; started a group called al Qaeda in Iraq—self  affiliated with Al Queda—and starting 
attracting recruits and conducting a lot of  very horrific, violent bombings, creating a lot of  problems 
for U.S. and Allied forces, and the newly-forming Iraqi Government.
In 2006, Zarkawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike. His successor is a fellow named Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. If  any of  you have seen ISIS videos, raise your hands if  you have watched either Flames 
of  War, of  any of  the ISIS promotional material. They have a very sophisticated media campaign. 
Ok, so most of  you actually haven’t. They are very clearly articulate what their goals are, and what 
their end-state is. Baghdadi has taken a lot of  mergers and acquisitions-type activity, he is a very 
entrepreneurial terrorist, and he rebranded initially as the Islamic State in Iraq- pulling together the 
former al Qaeda in Iraq, with other number of  terrorist groups, and created an expanded franchise 
to do more violence in the region.
During the surge of  U.S. forces, his kind of  whack-a-mole, squeeze out an infection, he moved into 
Syria. And as the civil unrest in Syria turned into a civil war in Syria, he rebranded again from the 
Islamic State in Iraq, to the Islamic State in the Levant, or, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, depending 
upon, kind of  the semantics, of  how you want to interpret the language. And was much more active 
in Syria; made a temporary alliance with another terrorist group called the Al Nusra Front to fight 
the Bashar al-Assad regime. Now, he gains a lot of  force by collaborating with Al Nusra, generating 
recruits, being the, kind of  creating, an NFL Super Bowl, Pro Bowl team of  terrorist globally.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Probably the Super Bowl more than Pro Bowl.
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ANDREW BORENE: And I hate to say that. But became so vicious that al Qaeda adherence, 
even watched to disavow relationships with ISIS/ISIL because they found that they were simply 
too violent. And that they were killing too many Muslims, in addition to what they saw as kafir, or 
Zionists, or Christians, or anyone who didn’t align with their very specific view of  radical Islam. 
They gained a lot of  steam, and after the U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, trainers and advisors left, 
the Iraqi Army was on its own, I think really, the only way we can say this, that we learned this year, 
just how aggressive and how quickly this Islamic State army could move. And they took over vast 
swaths of  western Iraq that were previously held by U.S. forces, handed over to the Iraqi Army. 
Iraqi general fled; the Iraqi forces essentially evaporated. So now, I think we just have to accept the 
pragmatic reality that there has ceased to exist a Syria state in the east of  Syria; there has ceased to 
exist an Iraqi state in the western parts of  Iraq. And although we do not recognize this outlaw group 
as a government, they are effectively holding and administering a lot of  real estate on that border 
between Iraq and Syria. That was a long answer, but was that sufficient?
STEPHEN VLADECK: No, that was fantastic. So at the risk of  asking us to talk for about thirty 
more seconds, I think, so at what point does this cross over into, now this become a question of  
U.S. military force. That is, to say, what exactly changed this summer, that moved ISIL/ISIS/Islamic 
State, from a, you know, pain in Syria and Iraq’s back, but whatever, to something that the U.S. 
actually needed to have an interest in responding to?
ANDREW BORENE: Well again, any of  you can watch Flames of  War, if  you find it on the 
internet, it’s about a 55 minute, self-produced documentary, makes very clear their intent to bring 
about an apocalyptic battle with crusader armies in Dabiq that will result in a global caliphate under 
their strict interpretation of  radical Islam. So they have made overt statements they are going to 
make blood flow in the streets of  America, they call out President Obama by name regularly, and 
the danger—I think there is actually part of, a responsibility to protect humanitarian concern. They 
pushed so quickly, so fast, displaced millions of  people; threatened to take over a dam in northern 
Iraq that could have caused flooding resulting in millions of  deaths. And made very clear that was on 
their list of  things to do. So really, I think they are a super terrorist-type organization, with clearly-
stated designs on striking our homeland, striking our partners, and you know, in many ways, it’s like a 
cancer that emerged much quicker than any of  us saw coming.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Great, thanks. So Cully and Daphne, let me sort of  Segway this down the 
table a little bit. So Andrew gave us the setup, the background, how we got to this summer. We know 
from the first panel, we probably know from our own experience, we have heard at different points 
from the Obama Administration, that the authority, the existing authorities to deal with ISIL, to use 
the force that’s been used, come from a combinations of  the President’s self-defense authority under 
Article II, the 2001 AUMF, and maybe even the 2002 AUMF. If  that’s true, what is wrong with the 
status quo, that is to say, why are we having this panel? Other than its fun, and we all get dressed up, 
and get these cool mugs, why is this a question that we should actually be talking about, as opposed 
to just saying: “President Obama is doing fine, all is well, nothing to see here.” 
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DAPHNE EVIATAR: I think that really . . . 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Could you turn on your mic, Daphne, sorry. The button in the middle.
DAPHNE EVIATAR: That says push? Thank you. And I want to say I do like the cups a lot. I think 
it’s really important because of  a combination of  the facts that you just explained, and also the facts 
that the current authorizations for the use of  military force have nothing to do with that conflict. 
So, you know, as we heard of  the last panel, the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, had very specific 
intentions in mind. Congress had very specific intentions. 2001 obviously was to go after the people, 
you know, who were involved in perpetrating—or harboring the people involved in perpetrating the 
9/11 attacks. 2002 was the supposed threat from, in Iraq. Both of  those have now—well, we could 
argue over whether the 2001 is still relevant. 2002: very strong case to be made that once Obama 
pulled out the last troops from Iraq, that war was over. I think it’s very hard to make the argument 
plausibly that ISIL is part of  the al Qaeda or Taliban that existed in 2001 that Congress authorized 
the war against.
So in a sense we are kind of  operating under a fraud, it is a bit fraudulent situation where you have, 
Article II doesn’t make sense here because this is not a direct threat here to the United States. Yes, 
ISIL is a horrible, brutal group, no doubt about it, presents a big threat to that area, they might have 
said in a video, I know I haven’t watched it, that they want to make blood run in the streets, here in 
Washington, D.C. for all I know, but that doesn’t mean that they have the capability to do that. And 
there’s been no evidence that I’ve seen that they do have the capability to do that, or to attack the 
United States at all. And a lot of  national security experts who have studied this very carefully say 
that they’re much less dangerous to the United States than al Qaeda is. And they really don’t have the 
capability to attack us.
And I think that’s why this matter now needs to go to Congress. Maybe there is a reason that we 
should be bombing or otherwise using our troops to attack ISIL- and it might be a humanitarian 
concern for example- but I think Congress and the American people need to have that debate. What 
is exactly the U.S. interest? Do we want to be authorizing the use of  our troops, whether you call 
them “boots on the ground” or whether they are in the air, or whether they may eventually end up 
on the ground? It is a lot of  U.S. military power going towards this fight. And Congress and the 
American people should be involved in debating whether that’s appropriate, and setting out the 
outlines for that war. Because if  you don’t have any limits, as we learned in the last panel, you end up 
having a kind of  perpetual, vague, poorly-defined war that could just go on forever. There are always 
going to be terrorists, in these groups, can continue to morph into one or another thing in another 
part of  the world. And we really need to clarify where it is we’re fighting, who it is we’re fighting, 
and why.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Daphne before I turn to Cully, can I ask one follow up question? So 
you said, when we pulled out of  Iraq, that conflict was over, and I guess I’m wondering if  that’s 
actually necessarily true. Right? So I guess the question is, what was that conflict? If  that conflict 
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was a conflict between the U.S. and the sovereign nation of  Iraq, that conflict was over long before 
we pulled out of  Iraq, right? If  that conflict was the non-international armed conflict, between the 
sovereign state of  Iraq and armed belligerent groups who resisted state authority in Iraq, isn’t there 
an argument that that conflict actually never ended, and in fact this is just a re-flare-up of  a conflict 
that the U.S. was a co-belligerent in, but that it actually is the same conflict that U.S. troops were sent 
to Iraq for in 2002?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: You could make that argument, but the fact that the United States withdrew 
its troops, and said that it was withdrawing, and made quite a public statement about that; Obama 
made quite a public statement about that. You’re right, that wasn’t the end of  the conflict in Iraq; 
it was the end of  the U.S. role in the conflict. So I think to go back into Iraq, the U.S. need to—
Congress need to—reauthorize a U.S. role in that conflict. The U.S. has to judge: is this a conflict we 
want to be involved in? Because it’s not the same conflict.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Sure. Cully?
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: Thanks for having me Steve, it’s always great to be with you, and 
all the panelists here. Let me go back to the first question you put to Daphne and me. And I think it 
requires us to actually look at the statutory language of  the AUMF so you understand what the 2001 
AUMF actually says. Because that’s when you can then bounce from there as to whether or not the 
Administration’s reliance on the 2001 AUMF makes sense- given not only what Andrew says about 
the historical development and creation of  ISIS, but also Matt Olson’s longer comments- he was 
the head of  NCTC- he gave comments on September the 3rd of  this year at Brookings, and really 
described at length who ISIS is.
But the 2001 AUMF says, and I think this strengthens Daphne’s first point, that the President 
is authorized to use, “All necessary force against those nations, organizations, or persons, he 
determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11th, 2001, or aided the attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of  international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”
And so the argument that you hear often is that ISIS didn’t exist when that statute was passed. 
Therefore, that statute can’t apply to ISIS. The contrary argument that you hear from some 
conservatives, like Steve Bradbury and others, is: Look: this is an interfamilial fight within al Qaeda. 
The fact that they are an amoeba and they keep replicating themselves; ISIS is al Qaeda and al Qaeda 
is ISIS. You don’t need a new statute.
Now, on the day that the Administration, the President gave his speech back in September, a senior 
administration official on background gave this legal justification for the 2001 AUMF acting as the 
domestic law statutory basis for using force against ISIS. And they said, and by the way you’re going 
to use glasses like this someday when you get to be my age, I found these about a month ago, they 
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work, so I like them.
STEPHEN VLADECK: You were able to see well enough to find the glasses?
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: I was at- I was judging a court marshal- and I was looking for a 
pen in the desk, and I opened up the drawer and there was no pen, but there were these glasses, and 
I thought, “Oh, I’ve never worn glasses.” And so I tried them and said, “Hey, these work.” So that’s 
why I use them.
Here is what the senior administration official said: “Based on ISIL’s longstanding relationship 
with al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden”- longstanding relationship; notice the contrast between that 
and the actual language from the statute. “Its long history of  conducting, and continued desire to 
conduct attacks against U.S. persons and interests, the extensive history of  U.S. combat operations 
against ISIL dating back to the time the group first affiliated with al Qaeda in 2004, and ISIL’s 
position, supported by some individual members and factions of  al Qaeda-aligned groups, that it 
is the true inheritor of  Osama Bin Laden’s legacy. The President may rely on the 2001 AUMF as 
statutory authority for the use of  force against ISIL, notwithstanding the recent public split between 
al Qaeda’s senior leadership and ISIL. In other words, hey, they got a divorce, but they’re still part of  
the same family.
Here’s the reason the debate matters, and this was really to Steve’s main part of  his question: this 
war, according to senior administration officials and those who were in the administration, is going 
to take a long time. President Obama said, “It takes time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL.” Panetta 
says it will be a thirty-year war. Petraeus says, “We are talking about years, many years.” And Clinton, 
Hillary Clinton, says, “We are talking about a long-term struggle.” And so I think, legally speaking, 
you can make the argument that ISIS fits neatly within the 2001 AUMF, or doesn’t fit neatly within 
the 2001 AUMF. But the fact is that, if  it’s going to be a long struggle- and these people would 
know- it certainly puts it on firmer political grounds to include ISIS in an AUMF.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Great. So Andrew Carswell, let me come to you with the next question, 
and let me sort of  set it up first.
So, one of  the things were heard a bit of  in the first panel, and that I think has complicated this 
entire discussion, is the expansion of  the 9/11 AUMF to encompass this idea of  associated forces. 
And the statute of  course says nothing, the term “associated forces” does not show up in the 9/11 
AUMF, it has been sort of  added by the Administration in speeches, and then sort of  codified, 
kind of, with regard to detention in the 2012 Defense Authorization Act. But I guess the idea is 
most analogous in international with the idea of  co-belligerency. That these are groups are basically 
aligned with a party of  the conflict and fighting against the opposite party. 
The problem of  course is that there hasn’t necessarily been transparency about which groups the 
United States believes are associated forces of  al Qaeda in this conflict. And it’s not even to what 
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extent transparency would solve the problem, what the substantive criteria should be. So I wonder, 
could you say a bit about how international law in general looks at this problem? And to what extent 
you think it’s complicating the current debate in the United States. 
ANDREW CARSWELL: Yeah, thanks a lot, and thanks very much for having me in the first place. 
I just wanted to maybe, I heard that there were some 1Ls here, and maybe it’s time to give a little 
bit of  international law 101, in terms of  the definition of  an armed conflict. You have international 
armed conflict, which is very straightforward, it’s between two states and it happens immediately 
when there’s a disagreement between states leading to the intervention of  their armed forces. We 
can talk about a non-international armed conflict, which is a little more complicated. There you’re 
talking about issues of  organization of  the parties and also the intensity of  the hostilities. And that 
comes out of  the Tatic decision of  the Yugoslav tribunal, which is now accepted to be the definition 
of  armed conflict.
So in an armed conflict, you’ve got—so let’s talk about NIAC: Non-International Armed Conflict- 
you’ve got two defined parties, and on the side of  the state armed forces, if  they’re involved in 
a non-international armed conflict, it is quite clear who can be targeted and who cannot under 
international law. Domestic law might prohibit it at the same time, but international law does not 
objectively prohibit it. And so when you’re looking at it from that perspective of  two parties like 
that, the question is how are you members- how can you become a member- of  an armed group? 
And that is a question that has been very, very difficult to define over the years.
In 2009 the ICRC, so my organization came out with an interpretative guidance document on direct 
participation in hostilities. And it looked at the issue of  membership, and it said there are a couple 
of  ways you can do that, but effectively it came down to a term called continuous combat function. 
And that is a very controversial term amongst academics, amongst practitioners. The concept is 
that you become a member by virtue of  your function. And your function can be shown overtly; 
it means you’re carrying your weapons overtly. It could be that you’re wearing an emblem, and so 
on. But that’s quite rare. Often it’s going to be that someone is directly participating in hostilities 
on a recurring basis. And so that’s already difficult to decide who is a member of  the group. But 
the important thing, the law of  armed conflict, or IHL, I use them interchangeably, International 
Humanitarian Law, only applies in relation to these two parties.
So when we’re talking about the conduct of  hostilities and the ability to use lethal force in the first 
resort, that’s only between the parties. So what happens when someone is vaguely associated with 
a group? So that is to say, let’s take a look at the London Underground bombers, going back a few 
years now. Here we have people who are in England, who are certainly affiliated in a loose sense 
with al Qaeda. They are individuals who subscribed to their dogma and so on. At the same time 
they were not part and parcel, they did not have the consent of  the leadership of  Osama Bin Laden 
or anybody else. So these were individuals who really were a group of  individuals. So going back 
to the definition of  armed conflict, you ask yourself, okay, within the United Kingdom, have they 
together formed an organized armed group which can be considered a party to an armed conflict? 
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Well no, they have not. So I think the British Government rightfully treated these people as a law 
enforcement issue.
So that’s, to say, the laws of  armed conflict- of  IHL- don’t apply to those individuals in relation to 
the type of  force being used. So you can be associated in a loose sense with a group, without actually 
falling under that conduct of  hostilities paradigm and being subject to lethal force in the first resort. 
However, does that mean that the hands of  the government are tied, does that mean you can’t get 
them off- it’s not the battlefield- but you can’t get them away from being a threat to you. And the 
answer to that question is clearly you can, that’s why you have the whole law enforcement context.
When people think law enforcement, they’re thinking about a bobby swinging a baton, but it’s not 
the case. Here, we’re talking more like a SWAT team. We’re talking about the ability to use lethal 
force, but only in the case of  imminent threat of  death to a human being. So it’s a self-defense 
paradigm whereas you cannot take that first shot like you can in the wartime paradigm. So this issue 
of  associated forces in the AUMF, really I think it has to be defined. Again, I am not an expert in the 
U.S. law, and I don’t purport to be. But at the same time, if  you’re going to call it an associated force, 
you’d have to define exactly whether you’re talking about someone who is associated, and is at the 
same time is considered to be a member of  that force, in which case by status they can be targeted. 
Or whether it’s somebody who is more loosely affiliated, in which case they cannot be target.
So I know that all sounded like a little bit of  a 101 lecture on international law, but I couldn’t get to 
the conclusion without going there.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So let me follow up a bit, though. So the whole- Cully put this quite well, 
and so did Andrew- that the media’s fascinating with the ISIS/ISIL story is the purported break, 
right? The schism. Between senior leaders of  ISIS/ISIL and senior leaders of  al Qaeda. If  that is 
factually correct, what significance, if  any, does it have to an international law analysis of  whether 
they could be treated as—of  whether CCF would apply? Right? Of  whether you could treat them as 
co-belligerents.
ANDREW CARSWELL: Well, from a purely international law perspective, and moving away from 
an AUMF, it makes no difference whatsoever because ISIL, ISIS, whatever you want to call them, are 
already engaged in an armed conflict both in Syria and in Iraq. You’ve already got the prerequisites, 
from the Tatic decision, for the definition of  an armed conflict in those two contexts. They are 
parties to each of  those conflicts, they can be targeted using lethal force in the first resort.
I a member of  ISIS leaves the battlefield, then that is a different issue but we can get into that 
perhaps later. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: And we’ll save Libya for a little bit down the road. Alright? So Andrew 
Borene let me come back to you. I may be putting words into both of  your mouths, I hope I’m 
not. But I heard Daphne to be saying a new statute is not just politically expedient but perhaps even 
necessary given the shortcomings of  the arguments for existing authorities. I heard Cully to at least 
endorsing at least the first part of  that premise that a new statute is certainly politically expedient, it 
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would be very helpful.
I guess I want to ask you: do you think it’s necessary? Do you think, I suspect we could all agree that 
it would be nice if  Congress did its job that is an easy thing in this town to have defined consensus 
on. Harder to ask whether it actually must. And I guess I’d love to hear your thoughts on that. 
ANDREW BORENE: Yeah. It’s a great question, and I think, you know, the absolute bottom line 
on this is a new authorization for the use of  military force against ISIL is not legally necessary. Any 
need for it has become overcome by events, we have been engaged actively in combat with them 
for a very long time, but in the near-term, this air campaign I think is closing in on the 60-90 day 
window shortly. It goes back to August. So overcome by events. Unless Congress is going to sue the 
President to stop, to take him to the Supreme Court, I don’t see that happening.
STEPHEN VLADECK: At least not on war powers.
ANDREW BORENE: Not on war powers, no. And the War Powers Resolution is on such 
desperately shady footing that the true check on the Executive by Congress that has never been 
disputed by the Supreme Court, is on appropriations and funding. That’s it. It’s in Article I, Section 
IX, as opposed to Section XVIII. That’s how they stopped the Vietnam War, that’s how the Boland 
Amendment is enforced. And that’s how ultimately, if  Congress disagrees with military operations 
against ISIL, that’s how they’re going to have to stop them.
In the near-term, there is an upcoming vote on overseas contingency operations budget 
amendments. So very soon, we will get a sense of  Congress, at least it will be a silent approval if  
they approve the $5 billion in funding that has been requested by the White House and the Pentagon 
to run specific operations against ISIL and they’re named right in there Operation Inherent Resolve, 
there’s going to be an Iraqi training and equipping force, they’re going to put more boots on the 
ground in Iraq. They will continue to replenish the supplies of  armaments that are dropped on 
targets in Syria and in Iraq. There will be an expanded capabilities enhancement program for 
Jordanian forces and for Lebanese Forces to counter the threat.
And so if  you really want to get into the nuts of  the granular level, what needs to be legally 
approved, it’s in here in the appropriations and the budgeting plan language. That said, I certainly 
think it would be very, very helpful, on a political basis, my firm advice to the White House and 
to Congress and to every American voter would be: please re-approve something so that we can 
maintain the moral high ground in this truly important struggle against very dangerous international 
terrorists, who have an ideology and a commitment to either hurt us badly or die trying. That has 
not changed since 2001. The groups have morphed a bit, but the ideology hasn’t changed, and I 
think that in some ways the unknowns about ISIL in terms of  their size, how many adherents they 
have, how many people traveling on U.S. passports, United Kingdom passports, other EU passports, 
are in the mix over there, we don’t actually know.
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Just this week it was confirmed a couple of  French citizens were self-radicalized, and have joined in 
the fight and participated in beheading videos. So I think there’s a lot of  questions to get answered. 
Political helpfulness will help the fight, internationally and the moral high-ground piece, for optics. 
Domestically, I think it sends a clear message that there is a joint effort, and it’s in a non-partisan 
way. That in this struggle against this extremist-type of  ideology, with a commitment to harm 
civilians, that we are united as a government, as political parties, for really and I would say beyond 
military force, to use all the elements of  the national power. Because if  that sense of  Congress 
were moved into it, I think then you would see more effort on things like capacity building, things 
like security partnerships. And I do want to bring up here, the piece, that I haven’t seen in a lot of  
these draft-language AUMFs, whether it was yours (Stephen), or any of  the bills, I think only one of  
them has an ‘in order to’ statement. But anyone with military experience knows that in mission-type 
orders, which are what we adhere to in the United States, and most of  our allies, it’s most effective to 
state the mission, the commander’s intent, if  you will, of  what the objective is.
The 2001 AUMF has a very clear ‘in order to’ statement. It says, “In order to prevent any future acts 
of  international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.” So I 
think that any AUMF should absolutely include an ‘in order to’ statement to clearly articulate what’s 
the strategic objective of  the effort. But I don’t know if  that answers your question clearly- I think 
it’s a political question- I think it’s important, not legally necessary today.
STEPHEN VLADECK: I just want to ask for one clarification, right? So you said it’s a struggle 
against an ideology. I assume you mean it’s a struggle against an ideology held by a specific group. 
Right? That this is not the, you know we’re not looking for statute against violent Islamic extremism, 
we’re looking for a statute about ISIL. 
ANDREW BORENE: I think the challenge is you end up with all kinds of  peripheral, very difficult 
to answer, soft-ground questions if  you try to define it as violent Muslim extremism. Because then 
you’ve moved into a religious conversation and a theological debate.
STEPHEN VLADECK: But also a conversation about groups that maybe have no capability or 
capacity to attack the U.S. in the present form, as opposed to ISIL. 
ANDREW BORENE: Absolutely. And so I think if  you are going to name names, you may need to 
name more than just ISIL. You may need to name Boko Haram, you may need to name AQAP, or 
whatever they peripherally spin into, but I think without some mechanism to adapt to whatever they 
rebrand themselves as, or where these other future alliances lie, there is no question that there is a 
nexus between these groups, that there is a shared ideology, and so I think it is important to identify 
what the mission is; which is really at the end of  the day, to prevent another attack of  international 
terrorism on a massive scale on civilians in the homeland.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So Daphne let me ask you. I wonder if  it’s also possible that a new statute 
would have a salutary effect, that folks who maybe don’t necessarily share Andrew Borene’s view of  
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the threat, might still support. Right? Which is to say, one way to look at the current situation is that 
the 9/11 AUMF has created an unstable legal climate. Right? That’s what Cully was alluding to in 
his opening comments. And that its open-endedness, its lack of  specificity, its lack of  clarity about 
associated forces, its lack of  geographic constraint. It’s basically, its ability to morph into whatever 
the President wants it to be, is actually a real problem from a democratic accountability standpoint.
A new statute at the very least, right, allows for renewed conversation and renewed debate. Do you 
think that’s a fair view?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: Yes, absolutely. I mean and again, whether you think it’s legally-required 
or not, it seems like there’s pretty strong agreement here that it’s politically really advisable. And 
for a lot of  reasons, and I would add that- I think it also- one reason it’s advisable is because I 
think it would require Congress to consider who exactly we’re at war against. And not just Muslim 
extremists, wherever they are. But ISIL, and if  there are other groups, to name them very specifically. 
And Congress does have to consider what’s their—what is the actual threat they pose to the United 
States. And each group might be different. Boko Haram isn’t the same as ISIL, AQAP isn’t the same 
as ISIL, they may or may not pose a threat that rises to the level of  justifying a war against them.
And this is where you get into the international law question as well. We don’t have the right to 
just kill people because we think they might, in the future, have the ability to attack us. But they 
don’t now. That’s not an actual threat to the United States and international law does not allow the 
United States to simply initiate aggression against parties that might say they want to attack the 
United States but actually have no intention to do so anytime soon. So I think one of  the important 
purposes of  a new law would be to specify who it is that we’re at war against with, and I agree 
completely, what is the objective? What is the mission? What exactly are we trying to accomplish? 
Because without making that clear, you do, you can end up in a very long-term situation where it’s 
not clear, and it’s not clear to the military perhaps, even what they’re authorized to do. It raises the 
question a bit about ground troops as well, which I think is, I don’t think it makes sense if  Congress 
is going to authorize a war, I don’t think it makes sense for Congress to say: “But you can’t use 
ground troops.” Like, either there is a threat that is strong enough that we are going to use our 
military, or there’s not. I don’t think that it’s Congress’ position to tell the military how to fight its 
war.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So I guess, I mean, it seems to me that there’s at least some degree of  
consensus among at least most of  the panelists, that a new statute would be politically-expedient. So 
what I would like to do is, shift our focus a bit to: what the statute should say. As opposed to the old 
academic, just sort of, howling at the moon, what’s wrong with everything? You know, let’s think out 
loud about how this statute should be designed. And so, with that in mind, let me start with, before 
we get to boots on the ground, let me start with the geography question. Should a new statute be 
geographically-constrained? Right, that is to say, should Congress, whatever else it provides in the 
statute, actually specify the countries in which it is authorizing force? As a matter of  law, policy, 
practice, whatever you think. And Cully, can I start with you on that one?
CHARLES “CULLY’ STIMSON: Sure. First off, it’s important- all of  us here are burdened with a 
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law degree or about to be burdened with a law degree, so we have a law centric view of  the world- a 
lawyer centric, rose colored glass view of  the world. So I think it goes without saying, but I’ll say it 
anyway, but an AUMF is not a substitute for a strategy. A strategy proceeds and necessarily is then 
followed by the legal authorization to carry out the strategy. And so, in our sort of  lawyer 101 view 
of  the world, we are focusing on the AUMF when in fact, as you heard from the previous panel, 
there have been dozens of  AUMF’s that this country has used and this the vast majority of  those 
AUMFs, the President, has penned the draft and sent it over to Congress. And so I find it very odd 
that newspapers and the rest are saying, “Oh Congress isn’t doing anything!” Well, it’s the President’s 
duty to lead, it’s the President’s duty to lay out the vision, it’s the President’s duty to lay out the 
strategy, and then it’s the President’s typical practice to lay out the AUMF. And the reason that 
hasn’t happened is because of  Syria last year. It’s a true statement. He got burned when he asked 
for something he didn’t get. And the elections took place and no one wanted to do any work on 
Congress or the White House except get themselves and the people in their party reelected. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: You’re not suggesting that the Congress is unable to go first?
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: No. In fact, the Congress is perfectly able to go first and there 
have been instances where the Congress has gone first. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: And indeed there are now thirteen different bills that have been introduced 
in Congress, including, perhaps most prominently, the one by Sen. Cain. 
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: Yes and that’s why I’m sorry that our other co-panelist wasn’t 
able to join us because there was an excellent CRS report laying out a table of  all the major 
proposals out there. Congress can and has done this in the past. You have the President saying that 
he wants to engage Congress in this, that he’s going to engage Congress in this, and Congress is 
sitting back saying, “okay go ahead.” And you have other members of  Congress who have done the 
hard work of  putting together a draft proposal to get the discussion going. 
To the geography question, notice that the 2001 AUMF did not have any geographical limits. In 
fact, this administration took the position, most notably in a speech by Eric Holder at Northwestern 
University last year where he said, “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in 
Afghanistan and indeed Congress nor the federal courts have limited the geographic scope of  our 
ability to use force in the current conflict in Afghanistan.” And I don’t think that’s surprising. With al 
Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and now ISIS, you find them where you can find them. 
If  an AUMF were to either be proposed by the President, or eventually crafted by Congress with 
the help of  the administration, as to the geography question, I think if  you were going to limit it all 
you would say that, “Armed force can only be used in places consistent with applicable international 
law.” And concerning the sovereignty or use of  force, that’s in the [Ben] Wittes proposal. That’s a 
wise way to do it. 
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STEPHEN VLADECK: So if  I understand, you’re saying that an express incorporation of  
international humanitarian law would do the work—that an express geographic limitation might be 
at least aimed at achieving. 
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: Yes. And to those who would say that would be a cheap way 
to do whatever you want and that won’t have any substantive restraints, I don’t think that’s true. 
Having worked as a JAG, having worked in the administration on the executive side, you have these 
discussions within the executive branch are cabined by not only the statute in front of  you, but by 
international law principles and law of  armed conflict principles. And so I think it is a constraining 
principle. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Andrew Carswell, can I ask you to weigh in on Cully’s latest point? 
Which is to say, without expressing an opinion on the merits of  it, do you think that an express 
incorporation of  IHL would in fact effectuate meaningful geographic constraints that are consistent 
with the principles you’ve suggested before. 
ANDREW CARSWELL: It’s certainly a good start. I think the problem is that we can’t always see 
the use of  force when the military is involved through the lens of  IHL or LOAC. In fact, there are 
cases in which it’s going to be a self-defense type of  paradigm. Now I want to give the example, 
the hypothetical. Say we have a member of  ISIS and he walks off  the battlefield. So he’s certainly 
a member of  an armed group, he’s certainly targetable ab initio in so far as the territory of  Syria or 
Iraq are concerned. But if  he walks off  the battlefield, say he’s going to somewhere in North Africa 
to see his family, and that particular country does not have an armed conflict. Under the AUMF 
structure, certainly the 2001 AUMF type of  structure parallel to that, this individual carries the 
battlefield with him. So, he’s walked away from- I’ve talked about the Tadic definition of  an armed 
conflict- he’s walked away from that armed conflict and now he’s gone to somewhere in North West 
Africa, and in that particular peaceful country he’s now created a warzone by being there. So in other 
words, a targeting party can use the conduct of  hostilities, means and methods of  warfare. They can 
throw the big stuff  at him and cause acceptable collateral damage to the civilian population of  that 
country. 
So one of  the big issues that the ICRC is addressing now, and it’s a very difficult issue, is whether 
in fact there is an ability to use extraterritorial force in this fashion. And right now it’s definitely in 
the balance and I’ll try to explain why. The individual who walks off  the battlefield, is indeed still 
as a matter of  status- he’s still got that umbilical cord leading back to the conflict, but he now finds 
himself  in a country where there is no armed conflict. 
If  you look at the laws of  armed conflict and you look at the structure of  Common Article 3 for 
non-international armed conflict and you look at the law of  international armed conflict and bring 
some of  that in, and I won’t get into that analysis here, most of  the law of  armed conflict is built 
around the structure of  territory and the Tadic decision confirmed that. It said that laws of  armed 
conflict applies where there is this level of  violence and organization of  the parties and applies to 
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the full territory. It was also determined after the fact that this is also applicable to a spillover conflict 
and this is uncontroversial. But once you leave the battlefield, the question is whether it still applies 
there. Everything I’ve seen so far in the arguments on the blogs and so on and on the academic level 
have not actually brought this factor into it, and I think it’s an important factor to bring in. Are you 
entitled to use lethal force as a first resort when somebody is away for the battlefield? By ICRC’s 
read, it’s not. It’s maybe more of  a policy issue now. We don’t have enough state practice to drive it. 
There’s a bit of  a void there a bit of  a vacuum, so ICRC is trying to persuade people that this is in 
fact the way to go, that once you’re in a country that is not in an armed conflict, you’re able to snatch 
that individual. Arguably you’re able to hold them under the laws of  war, that shouldn’t be an issue. 
But you don’t need to use lethal force at first resort because you’re not in a wartime context. Laws 
of  war were designed for that very specific and unusual context of  warfare, so let’s not turn every 
use of  military force against an armed group into a wartime power. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So I appreciate that point I want to bring Cully back in, I just have one 
clarification point of  I may. Which is—so if  I’m hearing you correctly, a statute that simply took a 
step of  saying “Such force must be consistent with existing international law”—? 
ANDREW CARSWELL: No problem. It’s consistent with existing law as applicable. You can always 
determine when it’s applicable or when it’s not applicable. Bringing it in is always going to be a 
positive from our prospective.
STEPHEN VLADECK: What I’m saying, is that the absence of  clear state practice might mean that 
is less of  a constraint. In other words, in your hypothetical, where we might want international law 
to not allow the use of  legal force in that context, the absence of  clearly developed state practice 
might not mean that international law would pose a clear constraint if  that were the only statutory 
trigger. Do you see what I’m saying?
ANDREW CARSWELL: I see what you’re saying. The U.S. government was going through this 
exact thinking a short time ago when you had the al-Libi snatch operation. Special Forces went in 
and picked him up out of  Libya and took him away. Now, it was also stated at the time that this was 
not a function of  opinio juris. We’re doing this because it’s a matter of  policy. We want to have this 
guy. 
But it’s the kind of  thing- I shouldn’t say this because the ICRC doesn’t have this public position- 
but you can see that argument that I just laid out is moving towards that position. You’ve got an 
ability to snatch the guy and you should because he’s outside the direct hostility zone.  This was a 
time when Libya was not in an armed conflict. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Cully, I know you want to jump in.
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: I just want to ask a question. Maybe I didn’t hear you correctly 
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and it’s an awkward question but I’ll try to frame it, Andrew. Did you just say, with respect to your 
hypothetical of  a terrorist who drops his pack to go visit his family in North Africa, that because 
there is no mechanism for him to expressly disavow his association (like in a criminal law case where 
you disavow a conspiracy that you were engaged in), you could nevertheless detain him, but you 
couldn’t target him?
ANDREW CARSWELL: “Target” is, as we all know in the military, a loaded term. What you can 
do- I’m not saying that at all. I’m saying this guy is a live threat. He’s left the battlefield. He’s gone to 
a new place. The question is whether you can use lethal force in the first resort. So talking in terms 
of  ROE, whether you can use status based force against him or conduct based. What I’m saying is 
that the ICRC is moving to the conduct based argument because there’s no requirement to use lethal 
force in the first resort in that situation. The laws of  war were never designed- and human rights 
law for that matter- none of  them were ever designed to tie the hands of  the state in that situation. 
There’s still a nexus to the armed conflict, and that’s why I say that the detention piece is arguably 
still flowing from the armed conflict. Arguably you can hold him under the laws of  war. Which 
means you don’t have to prosecute him necessarily, you can intern him and so on. That’s something 
the ICRC has always acknowledged. 
The only discrepancy between him being in theater and him being out of  theater is that you’re not 
allowed, according to this read, to fire a bullet from the beginning. You have to go in there and get 
him out, it doesn’t mean you’re not going to use lethal force. You can in fact, as you know very 
well under the law enforcement paradigm- security operations paradigm, whatever you want to call 
it. It’s derived from human rights law but the U.S. sees it coming from the general principles of  
international law. Whatever you want to call it, self-defense, it’s not use of  lethal force in the first 
resort. You can resort to your SWAT team type of  tactics. Pick him up and take him away and hold 
him under the laws of  war. If  you subscribe to the notion that detention authority flows with it, 
which is not uncontroversial.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So let me pivot this away from geography and international law, which I 
think we’ve teed up pretty well, to the question of  associated forces. Andrew let me start with you. It 
seems with regard to associated forces there are three possible approaches Congress could take. The 
first is, what I’ll call the classic congressional approach, which is “do nothing.” That is to say, to not 
address the issue at all in the statute, to say that the statute is specifically about ISIL and we’re not 
saying anything about anybody else. The second is to expressly allow whatever force is authorized 
to actually have the statute say, “We are expressly allowing force against groups that aren’t ISIL that 
meet these criteria.” The third is a variation on a proposal that was put forth on a Hoover Institution 
white paper last year, which is to instead delegate the authority to the President going forward, 
to simply certify that groups become associated forces on the condition that the President then 
publicize that certification so that it’s at least known who these groups are. And I guess, Andrew, I’m 
curious which of  those you think is the best—or least worst.   
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ANDREW BORENE: Wow. I don’t think this is a legal question. I think this is really an ethical 
question and an operational question. I think you lose surprise depending on what type of  notice 
requirement you put in. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Surprise we’re at war?
ANDREW BORENE: Well surprising that if  yeah, I think that’s interesting. The previous AUMF 
allows the President to determine who was associated. And it moves into all kinds of  interesting 
areas with state secrets and protection of  sources and methods and protection of  operational plans. 
Maybe there’s a mechanism, and I hate to say this, maybe there’s a mechanism to preserve both the 
very important interest in Congress being notified what groups, individuals, or nations are being 
targeted, and maintain the element of  surprise through a similar mechanism to briefing.
STEPHEN VLADECK: Like a Gang of  8 notification? 
ANDREW BORENE: Or they can brief  the full committees. That’s always a decision that the 
agencies themselves can make. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So if  I’m hearing you right, you’re suggesting that the associated use of  
forces mechanism that you prefer to be in the new statute is one where the American people would 
be clueless?
ANDREW BORENE: I didn’t say that. Okay I’ll get fun now. There is very clear legal and legislative 
and congressional and executive practice precedent that the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Committee on Intelligence are the people’s representatives on matters 
that involve sources and methods of  intelligence collection. The Armed Services Committees have 
oversight for military operations and planning. So I think by using those specialized committees as 
the vehicle, there is very long, established practice for that being a viable method. And that does not 
constitute keeping the American people in the dark about important elements to the operation. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Surveillance- you know, surveillance authorities or anything like that. 
ANDREW BORENE: But yes, absolutely yes. And I realize I’m in the minority at-
STEPHEN VLADECK: No, no, no, so putting aside the surveillance- I mean we could have a 
whole fight about the House Intelligence Committee and surveillance oversight, which would allow 
me to bring up my great exchange with Mike Rogers- leaving that aside. But there’s no precedent for, 
historically, for that kind of  classified oversight of  jus ad bellum questions. That is to say, to go to 
war with a group with which we were not previously at war. Would you at least agree with that?
ANDREW BORENE: Or an individual. I mean I think that this type of  conflict that we are 
engaged in- I mean there has been so much written about this conflict being somehow different than 
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others because we do end up with ethical dilemmas as a nation where we have to make a decision 
based on intelligence evidence whether or not we’re going to launch a drone strike with a hellfire 
missile to kill a U.S. citizen who is on foreign soil. Not in an area of  active hostilities as defined by 
any declaration of  war or AUMF. So the ethical dilemmas get very complicated. They’re probably 
not best served with mass 350 to 400 million people’s public consumption, at least not until after 
the fact when they can be revisited forensically for the political value. But yeah, I thank that we have 
to look at conventional mechanisms that are approved for very sensitive government operations 
in this particular realm of  counterterrorism as it stands today when you think about what are the 
effects of  missing on the defense. It’s like being a goalie in soccer. They got to be successful once; 
the government must be successful every time. The numbers of  people that have to be involved 
in these conspiracies doesn’t have to be huge. 9/11 was nineteen people, one of  whom got kind 
of  apprehended. I realize I kind of  got on my soapbox here, but recognize that it’s not as simple 
as “Hey the founders in 1787 August had this discussion about ‘make’ versus ‘declare’ war.” It’s 
hundreds of  years later. The macro threats posed by very small groups of  individuals to the global 
economy, to our homeland, to the lives of  innocent civilians, is not insignificant and I think you 
have to take that into consideration into how you allow the government to run counterterrorism 
operations.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So just to take your soccer metaphor to the last point. In effect, the 
American people can know there is a soccer game going on, but don’t get to see the ball. 
ANDREW BORENE: The American people will see the ball. And I think there are ways, again—
forensically where, in advance, the committees can be briefed, they are briefed, they do have 
oversight. There’s another structural factor here. For instance, regulation of  anything. In any 
regulatory regime, sometimes the more you regulate, the more things move into the black market. 
If  you enhance taxes too much, if  you prohibit alcohol, it moves the black market, now organized 
crime is running. For the government example, I think the thing is if  you squeeze too hard on 
demanding full public accountability for all intelligence operations, for instance, you will end up with 
very very secretive secret government intelligence operations. Similarly, if  force everything- if  you’re 
going to mandate reporting for everything under Title 10 or conventional defense authorities, what 
will start to happen to maintain secrecy and operational security effectiveness is that a lot of  that 
stuff  will move into covert operations or clandestine service operations because that’s how they will 
be able to fulfill those requirements for secrecy. It’s a tough balancing act, it’s as old as the republic 
or any other nation, but you have to allow some level of  appropriate secrecy for government 
operations, particularly in areas of  war and security. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: I agree with that completely. I guess I’ve taken the ‘moderate’ out of  
moderator. I agree with that completely- all I’m trying to suggest is, it seems to be a difference 
between individual operational details, where you and I are in complete agreement about the need 
for secrecy, and the larger question of  the identity of  the groups that we think, in general, we have 
the legal authority to use force against. That strikes me as a relevant and material distinction, but you 
and I may have to just agree to disagree on that. 
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Daphne, can I ask you about the associated forces problem and how you would want the statute to 
reflect that?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: First I have to say that when you’re talking about the soccer analogy, it seems 
to me that it’s not hiding the ball. It’s hiding who’s the other team that we’re playing against. And I 
think that’s kind of  outrageous to say that the U.S. government should be able to go to war and not 
say who we’re fighting. I completely agree and understand that a lot of  intelligence operations need 
to be secret. It’s more like, okay, the coach gets to keep his strategy for winning the game secret, 
okay that’s understandable. But you can’t not say who the game is against. So I think that with the 
associated forces, it’s really important to name exactly who those associated forces are. You don’t 
have to name any particular individual, but they generally know who they are anyway because they 
know they’re fighting and they know they’re a member of  this organization. That’s really not a big 
secret. That’s very different than saying, we’re going to use this particular strategy, we’re going to 
snatch this person at this time, we’re going to use a drone at this particular time. 
The other I just want to say- I guess this is going back to the geography point, but it relates to the 
associates forces- which is that I think it’s really important to incorporate the international law 
limitations, but that in itself  doesn’t tend to stop Congress from much or this administration from 
much. So I think, both as a matter of  geography and as a matter of  who is the enemy, the 2001 
AUMF, by failing to identify those things became this amorphous law that has been used for thirteen 
years now to justify a war that has changed very much in different locations. And it has also been 
used to justify covert targeted killing operations in countries that we’ve never declared war against, 
for example Yemen and Somalia. And it’s not clear that those would fall under the definition of  
a war under international law—very likely they would not. War between the United States and 
terrorists operating in those countries probably does not rise to the level of  a non-international 
armed conflict. So I think that it’s really important that any new AUMF specify both who exactly the 
enemy is, including the associated forces, and if  that changes over time, come back to Congress and 
tell Congress that, and the geography of  where we’re fighting the war. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So I wanted to get to sunsets, but I know Cully and Andrew Carswell both 
want to respond, so Cully why don’t I come to you first, then Andrew. 
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: May 16, 2013, which was last year, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee held a full hearing on the law of  war and the law of  armed conflict and the AUMF. 
The first panel were senior administration officials. I was on the second panel with Jack Goldsmith 
among other people, Geoff  Corn, etc. It was very clear to us in the second panel, as we were sitting 
there listening to the administration officials speak, that the practical application of  the 2001 statute 
had gone well beyond what any of  us had thought up until that point. We’ve declared war only five 
times in our nation’s history. As the previous panel pointed out, we’ve had dozens and dozens of  
AUMFs. Many of  which—well, in our declarations of  war, we named the enemy. In the AUMFs, 
sometimes we named the enemy, sometimes we didn’t. In the 2001 AUMF, we did not name the 
enemy. But at least insofar as the detention part of  the law of  armed conflict of  AUMF goes, the 
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enemy came to be known as al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. So if  you look at the habeas cases 
that came out of  Guantanamo and the court decisions, it was pretty clear that the court has sort 
of  filled in the gaps of  who these associated forces are. Whether you fall into status as a belligerent 
or whether you don’t and your habeas petition is granted. And so, between the three options that 
Steve gave do nothing to put in the statute or the Hoover proposal, which if  you haven’t read it, you 
should read it, it’s very interesting. The benefit of  putting it in the statute, is that not only do you put 
it on firmer political grounds, domestically and internationally, the fact that you are targeting ISIL, 
or ISIS as I prefer to say, but you give the administration—the Commander-in-Chief—the flexibility 
to make those real time determinations of  whether they are indeed true associated forces engaged in 
hostilities against American forces. And then you put on top of  that strict oversight, so that you can 
see whether they’re straying too far away from the farm, which is the tendency of  the executive to 
do regardless of  who is in power. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Andrew- 
ANDREW CARSWELL: Daphne you had some very good points. I just wanted to give you maybe 
the ICRC perspective on Yemen or Somalia because you mentioned those two. In both of  those 
cases, the ICRC would say that you have a pre-existing non-international armed conflict. So in 
Yemen, you already have the Yemeni government fighting against al-Shabaab- excuse me, AQAP. 
In Somalia you have the Transitional Federal Government fighting against al-Shabaab. Those are 
pre-existing conflicts. So when the U.S. comes in and joins the government in that fight against 
a non-state armed group they’ve effectively joined the conduct of  hostilities paradigm. They’ve 
joined the whole armed conflict construct, and by ICRC’s read, they’re entitled to use distinction, 
proportionality, and precaution, all the basic principles of  targeting in armed conflict in those 
countries. So the fact that maybe the force between the U.S. and that particular group doesn’t rise to 
that level, it doesn’t have to in those cases because they’re joining in a preexisting NIAC. 
And from that perspective- I just want to make it clear that when I talk about geography of  war, to 
my knowledge we haven’t seen a strike anywhere in the world that’s not in a defined armed conflict. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So far as we know.
ANDREW CARSWELL: So far as we know, yeah. What we’re trying to do right now is preemptive 
in a sense. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: The allegation, I think, that has never been verified that comes the closest 
is Mali and whether the U.S. was engaged in any active operations in Mali. But I may be getting to- 
So Andrew, really quickly let me ask, how relevant to your last point is the host sovereign’s consent? 
One of  the issues that has come up in this conversation is the importance or not as a matter of  U.S. 
or international law of  the consent of  Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia to uses of  force on their soil by 
the United States. Can you say a word about that?  
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ANDREW CARSWELL: I can but I’m giving caveats here, there, and everywhere, I can’t speak to 
domestic law, and I can’t actually get into detail about jus ad bellum politics because we don’t go 
there, but I can give a couple of  fundamentals. You’ve got three levels of  law that are working at 
the same time from an international perspective. You’ve got the jus ad bellum, the U.N. charter type 
of  law, whether you can use force against a sovereign country; you’ve got the IHL level coverage 
which talks about the protection of  those who are no longer participating in hostilities; and then 
you’ve got this human rights law which arguably applies, and the U.S. government disagrees that 
it applies extraterritorially. So all these three things are happening in concert at the same time. So 
whether a state consents or does not consent is going to affect the top test, of  the jus ad bellum. If  
the country doesn’t consent and you go ahead and do it anyway, you violate the jus ad bellum, that 
doesn’t affect the fact that you still have to abide by the jus in bello.  So we can get into—if  there is 
consent then you’re good to go. If  you’ve got Chapter 7 authority from the Security Council, you’re 
good to go. If  there’s an armed attack under Article 51 of  the U.N. charter, you’re good to go, but 
what constitutes an armed attack is very controversial, pre-emptive versus anticipatory self-defense 
is controversial, but we need to take a step back because when we get political we start to lose our 
humanitarian focus.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So, I have two more sort of  buckets of  questions before we turn it over to 
your questions. The first, I have to say I am pleasantly surprised by the commonality in the proposals 
of  some kind of  sunset. That is actually not a common element of  most AUMFs historically. There 
are only one or two examples of  Congress putting an express sunset provision into a prior use 
of  force authorization, but it seems to be, sort of, a point in which there seems to be consensus 
that there should be a sunset in any new ISIL-specific statute. I’m curious for the reactions of  the 
panelists to both whether there should be a sunset? And if  so, how long? Andrew-
ANDREW BORENE: Back to my ‘in order to’ statement, I think if  you look at the requests and 
the statements from the White House and I think several members of  Congress, both parties, the 
“in order to” statement starts to look like “in order to degrade and destroy ISIL or ISIS.” Right? So 
I am not sure how we are going to define the destruction of  the Islamic state in Iraq and Levant 
or Daesh. I guess if  you say Daesh it is offensive to them somehow so we are supposed to say 
that now, according to some politicians. Some policy people in E.U. came up with that one too, I 
think. Apparently it means a bigot who imposes their will on other people in the local vernacular; 
so, if  you want to offend them we call them sissies or Daesh; but, in reality if  the intent is more 
akin to a declaration of  war against a non-state. I think it is very important to remember also that 
these people are not privileged combatants. They are not people operating within the construct of  
international humanitarian law. It’s very- I think domestic jurisprudence- we should have agreement 
here from the former these are not privileged combatants by any construct of  international law. 
They don’t get, unless they have fit themselves into the box of  bearing arms openly, wearing 
uniforms, and none of  them do to my knowledge, swearing bayat to your terrorist group of  choice 
does not constitute sufficient privilege to get the protection of  international law. 
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STEPHEN VLADECK: But separate from these jus in bello questions because I really do not want 
to get into the law, I do not think we will have time if  we start talking about jus in bello. 
ANDREW BORENE: So the question is how do you define the destruction of  a non-state to say in 
order to degrade and destroy ISIL if  that is the endpoint, which I think is a logical endpoint, but at 
what point is that? Is that when Iraq is under the control of  the Iraqi government as we support it 
and Syria is back under the control-
STEPHEN VLADECK: But does that need to be the question? Because what I hear in your 
response is that you view a sunset as an expiration provision and of  course as you know that in the 
national security context it actually hasn’t typically been true. So, if  you look for example the FISA 
Amendment of  2008 where there was a sunset entirely because Congress was like well we’re not sure 
if  we are going to like this and so the administration says put a sunset in it, you can come back to it. 
Congress has now reauthorized that twice without blinking. So, do you need to have the answer to 
the when is ISIL destroyed question in order to answer the sunset question?
ANDREW BORENE: No, but what I am saying is, was the strategic objective is important? And 
how long may it take? And if  it is on the order of  years then I think the sunset should also be on 
the order of  multiple years, perhaps five to ten. I think any AUMF where you start looking at one to 
two year type renewals, it turns into the same problems the Pentagon faces right now on the Budget 
Control Act. It is tough to make a strategic plan when you are constantly looking for a continuing 
resolution for how to do your budget planning. Similarly, for operational planning for successful 
campaign to destroy ISIL, I think looking at it on a one to two year recurring basis makes it too 
tight, so at least five to ten years. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Five to ten years. Alright. So we have five to ten years on the floor. 
Panelists?
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: You sound like an auctioneer.
STEPHEN VLADECK: I was just thinking that.
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: Do I have a five, do I have five? Can I hear a ten?!
STEPHEN VLADECK: I don’t think we are necessarily going in one direction or the other.
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: I don’t think you can answer the question. I hate to do a copout. 
You have to have a strategy first, you got to hear from the President what the goal is. We have heard 
degrade and defeat. If  they amplify that and say destroy, eradicate, from the face of  this Earth, 
you’ve heard from the four senior administration or former administration officials how long they 
think it’s going to take. Ultimately it is a political question, not a legal question; and then there is the 
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subtle point that you made Steve, and that is, you know, is it an end date or is it simply a come back 
to us and we will take another look, date. And so I think that if  they are dead serious about actually 
destroying them, then you don’t have a sunset. If  they don’t think they have the political will for a 
long struggle to ultimately crush them, then you have either an end date or you have a “come back 
to us.” But whatever it is going to be, it can’t be before the next President takes office; it’s just not 
politically sustainable. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So I think that the most common proposal, right, is somewhere around 
the order of  two to three years. So that would be on the far end of  the 2016 presidential and 
congressional elections, so it would be a new Congress. Daphne, do you have any thoughts?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: Yeah, I mean I think- I agree it’s tied to what the mission is. I have always 
been pretty confused on whether it is degrade and destroy I mean, isn’t it one or the other-
STEPHEN VLADECK: You mean like compare and contrast?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: Yeah, if  you’re just going to try to hurt them so they are less likely able to 
hurt us, that’s one thing. Destroy is really different. I think that’s one reason Congress needs to 
decide what the objective is that they’ll support. Then I think that again what we’ve seen from the 
2001 AUMF is when there is no sunset, it threatens to go on and on and on. Although I hesitate to 
say a specific time period because I am not in the military and I understand completely that there 
are very practical reasons you need to be able to plan for a certain time period. I think that there 
should be some sunset, I would say less than five to ten years more on the order of  two to three 
years. But that it does have to part of  the discussion in Congress about what should be the objective 
and it should be tied to that. It’s not to say that the President loses his authority then it just means 
Congress has to re-decide whether or not we want to continue to be in this war.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So it’s degrade or destroy?
DAPHNE EVIATAR: Yeah they have to figure that out.
STEPHEN VLADECK: This is actually my old line about big and tall stories, as a big and tall 
person. So big and tall stores are not really big and tall, it’s more a big or tall store.
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: I’ve never been to one of  those.
STEPHEN VLADECK: You have something to aspire to over there, Cully. So my last question 
before we turn to you guys and I encourage folks who have questions of  their own to make their 
way to the microphones. Let me start with a quote, and this is from Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Boumediene (Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008)) in 2008. At the very end of  
his opinion about why the Guantanamo detainees are protected by the suspension clause, Kennedy 
went on a very strange tangent. And what he said is, “because our nation’s past military conflicts 
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have been of  limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of  war powers 
undefined. If  as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, 
the court might not have this luxury. This result is not inevitable, however, the political branches 
consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the constitution can engage 
in a genuine debate about how best to preserve Constitutional values while protecting the nation 
from terrorism.” So, I read this language from Kennedy as saying dear political branches, get your 
stuff  together. This is your job, it has now been seven years, it has been another six years since you 
cast AUMF and you’ve down nothing meaningful to actually clarify these authorities. And if  you 
don’t do anything meaningful, we will. Am I overly optimistic about Justice Kennedy or do you guys 
actually share the view that the courts may eventually find their hands forced if, notwithstanding our 
consensus, Congress does nothing in this arena . . . Oh I finally stumped you! Andrew.
   
ANDREW BORENE: I’m just going to answer. The courts, particularly the Supreme Court, 
tend to be extremely deferential to national security. I hate to say this because in many ways it is 
embarrassing for Americans to admit it, but Korematsu may actually be good law, right?
STEPHEN VLADECK: Depends on what you mean by good law.
ANDREW BORENE: Well, I don’t mean good law. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: The Korematsu decision has been vacated, right? Anyways, I’m sorry.
ANDREW BORENE: Well, I’m just saying, there is not a firm ruling contravening it yet. Right, 
I think we would all argue that that’s likely to change in future time. However, the courts are 
traditionally very deferential to national security. So, for that reason, and I think- we can’t predict the 
future, but politics matters, and what would happen to the public mood, right now I think 90% of  
Americans are afraid that ISIS can attack us here in the homeland. I think more than two thirds-
STEPHEN VLADECK: 90%?
ANDREW BORENE: That was the last number I just read.
DAPHNE EVIATAR: Something crazy.
ANDREW BORENE: Yes, that is a crazy number. 67% support military action against them. So, 
that’s a far cry than it was in February, 2003 when I was in the deserts of  Kuwait contemplating, 
being part of  the- I wasn’t contemplating being part of  the force, that wasn’t by choice anymore- 
but as the Presidents in the Clinton administration were debating whether to invade Iraq to pursue 
WMDs that might or might not have been there. And so I think, we can’t know-
STEPHEN VLADECK: We’re still going off  might or might not have been there?
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ANDREW BORENE: I’ll go with not there. But nobody was more grateful for that than me. 
Having driven in a Humvee with no doors through Baghdad. But my point is that we don’t want 
to fight the last war, and right now, kind of  like there was a hangover Vietnam that results in the 
War Powers Resolution which everybody on both panels both agreed that that was not a perfect 
piece of  legislation. Right now we are concerned because there is a very serious hangover for 
many of, us myself  included, that the WMD argument to invade Iraq for preemptive reasons was 
a bad one. It was not related directly to 9/11 and, there is- it created some bad blood around the 
world for America. Now, does that mean that right now because ISIS is emerging in the same 
geographical region and we do need this sustain counter-terrorism operations that we need to 
throw the bathwater out with the baby and start restricting the President his executive authority or 
her executive authority as Commander-in-Chief  because we’re afraid that they might do a do-over 
of  2003 Iraq? And I think we need to be careful because the courts will be deferential to executive 
judgment in matters of  national security. I think frequently more so than they are to Congress, with 
the rare exception of  that budgetary appropriations argument, which I don’t think it has ever- there 
are probably smarter law professors than me- I don’t think that’s ever been defeated or argued that 
Article 1, Section 9 Appropriations Authority is not an appropriate measure for Congress to stop the 
executive from doing activity . . . you name it. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: Anybody else on the courts? Cully? 
CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: You have to remember, and you know this, Steve and Daphne, 
and Andrew quite well, that Kennedy has for some time, occupied a unique position on the court. 
It has given him the ability to be on the soapbox and call balls and strikes and push cases one way 
or the other. Boumediene was the last in a long series of  cases before the court that Lou touched 
on starting in Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan. And my sense of  that quote is not that they’re eager to get 
back in the game; but that, they were getting tired of  having to weigh in on these matters and that he 
was encouraging, which is perhaps his role, perhaps not, Congress to make sure that knowing that 
this conflict was going to last a long period of  time, that they needed to have more clarification and 
more debate and more clarity in statues with respect to legal authorization for various aspects in the 
long war. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: And I’ll just add, to my mind, one of  the most interesting opinions to 
come out of  the Supreme Court this year was an opinion concurring with the denial of  certiorari 
in a case called Hussein v. Obama (Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621, 1622 (2014)) where Justice 
Breyer who has not been a particularly active voice on these questions, goes out of  his way to say 
there are actually some really big questions about the 9/11 AUMF that we still haven’t answered. 
For example, does it apply outside of  Afghanistan at all? And does it really allow for potentially 
indefinite detention of  someone who is not necessarily engaged in armed conflict the time he was 
captured. Now Breyer says Hussein wasn’t the case to resolve that but if  he’s right that there are 
multiple justices who believe these are questions that aren’t answered by them- maybe by the D.C. 
Circuit they are- I wonder if  it might be sooner rather than later on that front, especially since we 
have 143 men at Guantanamo. 
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ANDREW BORENE: 148.
STEPHEN VLADECK: 143. They released five this morning. BOOM current events! That’s why 
you got to be on Twitter. So with that, I learned that during the first panel so I was cheating. Let’s 
turn to questions from the audience. 
PAUL SCHWEN (Question 1): In 2010, Obama said that Congress didn’t intend for the AUMF 
to be limited by international law, and I know that statement was supposed to be dictum, but 
considering that the international law to authorize force that comes out of  post-World War II 
and state-on-state regime, was Judge Brown right since the enemy today is a non-state actor, that’s 
irregular combatant and any military force or statute that authorizes that force to effectively go after 
this combatant would necessarily either violate international law or operate outside of  it? What can 
we do about that, moving forward with the international law?
ANDREW CARSWELL: Excellent question. There is nothing in international law which is going 
to prohibit you from going after non state-armed group in the regular course. There are some 
situations where you can’t go after them. It might be the jus ad bellum, it might be the UN Charter 
type of  issue where you can’t get through the sovereignty issues, you got a country that is unable 
to deal with the threat but they don’t want to let you in. That gets into the jus ad bellum issue. In 
terms of  actually prosecuting a war against these individuals, you’ve got all the construct, and this is 
where I have to disagree with my esteemed colleague, who is very persuasive, but when it comes to 
the issue of  non-state armed groups, it’s not an issue of  whether they follow a chain of  command 
and so on, it all comes down to separate tests; whether they’re organized and whether the intensity 
has reached a particular level. So if  they’ve reached those two things then the case law of  the 
international criminal courts has said that in fact IHL applies to both sides, to both parties. So from 
an ICRC perspective we go out and actively talk to these groups. I’ve done it myself  in some groups 
in Southern Syria for example, we actually talked to them about their obligations under the laws 
of  war. I’m not saying spoken that I spoke to ISIS, but it’s extremely important that we remember 
the notion of  equivalency of  belligerence and that the laws of  war apply to all parties of  an armed 
conflict and that we try to persuade all the parties to go down that road. Now, when will we reach 
that point with ISIS? If  ever, I don’t know, but I can tell you that for example we were able to move 
convoys in these countries, talking about Iraq and Syria. We were able to somehow get the word 
out, might be indirectly, that these convoys are going through please don’t attack. That’s a successful 
framework we have now. Can we get to the next stage of  actually saying by the way now you’re 
now a formed party to an armed conflict and can we have discussion of  the laws of  war. That’s a 
very delicate issue and I’m not going to be overly optimistic, you don’t give up hope because there 
have been cases where for example, in Afghanistan we were able to talk to the Taliban with their 
leadership, about their obligations and getting them code of  conduct, and so on. I’m kind of  drifting 
off  from the center of  your question, I just wanted to answer that part of  it. The international law 
does not in any way, inhibit a state from prosecuting a war against these individuals. There will be 
cases where it does get in the way like jus ad bellum. But even if  that does happen, you still have 
laws of  conflict applicable. 
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STEPHEN VLADECK: One of  the things, as a matter of  domestic law, one of  the ironies I always 
found with Judge Brown’s opinion is that if  you actually go back to Hamdi. Hamdi is a 2004 case 
where the Supreme Court says the AUMF does include detention authority, even though the 9/11 
AUMF is silent to detention. Justice O’Connor was quite clear that the reason why she believed that 
AUMF brought with it detention authority was because it should be interpreted consistent with 
the law of  armed conflict, and that it was a necessary incident of  the law of  armed conflict that 
you detain as part of  an armed conflict, especially because detention is preferable to unnecessary 
killing. The irony to me of  Judge Brown’s reasoning was if  the AUMF’s was not constrained by 
international law, then the AUMF presumably is not also incorporating international law and 
therefore there isn’t any obvious detention authority in the AUMF. I mean, that was always one of  
the things that struck me in her opinion, but maybe that’s just me. Anyways, next question.
MARK DAVID: Mark David, I’m a Navy JAG. I’m just curious.  It seems like there is a consensus 
on the panel, if  I heard everyone correctly, that AUMF is imperfect for this current conflict-
STEPHEN VLADECK: The 9/11 AUMF
MARK DAVID: The 9/11 AUMF is imperfect for military force in ISIS. I’m just curious, 
independent of  the AUMF, any panelist can answer this question. What are your opinions? ISIS has 
beheaded three American citizens, claims a war, seems like they want to suggest doing more horrible 
things against American citizens. Independent of  the AUMF, does the President have authority to 
use military force against ISIS?
STEPHEN VLADECK: So this is for the self-defense question.
ANDREW BORENE: I would say absolutely. I think without a doubt that the first duty of  the 
President of  the United States is the security of  the nation as Commander-in-Chief. Article 2 
Section 2. He doesn’t need to wait for congressional approval to defend. Then you have to enter 
into a calculus of  what’s the capability level, the intent, capability, and the imminence of  the 
threat. I think that then becomes more of  a political question in some ways about how you make 
that assessment. I mean if  you’re a JAG you get it. Similar principles common to all international 
humanitarian law apply: proportionality, imminence, reducing civilian causalities.
STEPHEN VLADEK: But Andrew, you’re not suggesting that the threat ISIS poses and the 
three attacks provided general warrant for uses of  force against ISIS wherever they are? I mean 
presumably if  it is a self-defense argument it has to be tied to something more specific. Right?
ANDREW BORENE: Does it? I’m asking the same question you are. Under Article 51, 
internationally, U.N. charter, now I’m under Chapter 7, Article 51 self-defense, as determined by 
the nation itself, and the President has the authority to be the Commander-in-Chief  and defend 
the homeland, and the national counterterrorism center and the CIA counterterrorism center get 
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together and write a big report and say “hey these five people are going to come cut off  heads in 
Manhattan next week,” to me, it seems pretty clear the President has the authority to use lethal force.
STEPHEN VLADECK: So the analogy I always use in my class. Let’s go after Pearl Harbor. I think 
we would all agree that FDR, had he known anything or had acted on apparently what he might 
have known, would clearly have the authority to shoot down the Japanese planes once they’re in U.S. 
airspace before they drop the bomb on Pearl Harbor. So then back that up. Can you shoot down 
Japanese planes while they’re over the international or Pacific Ocean? Can you attack the aircraft 
carrier before the Japanese planes can take off? Can you attack the Japanese aircraft carriers when 
they’re still in port in November in Japan? Surely there is a point going backwards on that chain 
where you can no longer use force in self-defense.
ANDREW BORENE: That’s what makes this particular conflict with this particular enemy very 
difficult. Because they make an overstatement that they want to hurt you or die trying. That makes 
it very difficult I think. In a way if  you want to use a WWII analogy, you take the worst of  the 
Nazi S.S. with their genocidal, no respect for humanitarian law designs for global domination, and 
you mix it with the worst of  the worst of  kamikaze culture. You put those two together in a very 
horrible enemy. So I think that yeah, those factors have to weigh in to the decision. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: I don’t disagree with that. All I have to say is that I think that’s only 
a further argument for Congress. To avoid pushing the President to rely too aggressively on 
authorities that are best I think exercise in the breach. Maybe that’s only a further argument why we 
need a statute. 
ANDREW CARSWELL: Just really quickly, only Article 51 governs situations where you’re worried 
about getting through the sovereignty of  a country. In the case here when you have consent from 
the Iraqi government or you’ve made an argument to get into Syria through self-defense of  Iraq. In 
either case, you’ve got a way to get there. I think what you’re talking about is relevant to Syria, it’s not 
relevant to Iraq because of  the consent issue. 
STEPHEN VLADECK: So I guess the honor of  the last question goes to our Editor-in-Chief, 
Caitlin Marchand. 
QUESTION: So with the 2001 AUMF, it kind of  laid out a little bit, and we kind of  relied on it for 
our detention policies, if  we were to have our ISIS AUMF what if  the President tried to claim robust 
detention authority, would you think he is able to do that since he is kind of  right now using the self  
defense argument of  why we are going after ISIS? Do you think detention policies are really even 
necessary since we are using air instead of  boots on the ground?
ANDREW BORENE: I don’t know if  it’s especially decided if  we will ever use boots on the ground 
either.
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CHARLES “CULLY” STIMSON: Think of  it a different way. If, and I think it’s going to happen, 
we capture an ISIS person, and there is no statute, ISIS specific AUMF, would it be more or less 
difficult for the government in court precedes, assuming let’s say they took him to Gitmo, which 
they won’t do , to justify their detention? The answer is it’s harder. So I think by including ISIS or 
having an ISIS specific AUMF for merging the substantive groups in a new statute, like al Qaeda, 
Afghan Taliban, and ISIS into a new statute and repealing the 2001 or 2002. I don’t think there is 
any doubt that if  an ISIS detainee was detained and that authority to detain was challenged then they 
would be on much stronger legal ground then they are now.
STEPHEN VLADECK: I would just like to say two things. First, I think practically this isn’t 
going to matter. What I mean by that is we may pick up people but I don’t see this administration 
subjecting any new individuals to long-term military detention whether at Guantanamo or elsewhere. 
Perhaps we might try to get the Iraqi government to detain these individuals or others. So practically 
I don’t think this is an issue. But if  we do end up re-detaining, starting from scratch, the law now 
is fairly well settled in ways that it wasn’t when we started Guantanamo, and it is well settled in two 
respects. First, there is a far-wider panoply of  criminal offenses that clearly applied extra territorial 
conduct. So you won’t have the problem we have with Guantanamo with detainees who aren’t 
chargeable with any offense. But second, the jurisdictional question is settled, and so it won’t take 
seven or eight years to litigate the power of  the federal courts to hear their habeas cases, they’ll go 
straight to the merits. I think that more than anything else, is the reason why there won’t be much of  
an incentive to have these cases, lest you give the courts the very in to decide these questions about 
the scope of  the war powers they’ve historically resisted. Wow I didn’t mean to talk that much. So 
with that why don’t you guys join me in thanking our panel for a really helpful, lively discussion? 
We have solved everything. And on behalf  of  Jesse, Caitlin, and the National Security Law Brief) let 
me invite everyone except you people watching on the livestream to food and beverages out on the 
foyer. Thank you very much.
